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FOREWORD 
 
Founded in 1932, the Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan civic 
organization devoted to influencing constructive change in the finances and services of New 
York State and New York City governments. A major activity of the Commission is 
conducting research on the financial and management practices of the State and City.  
 
All research by the CBC is overseen by a committee of its Trustees. This report was 
completed under auspices of the Budget Policy Research Committee. We serve as co-chairs 
of that Committee. The other members of the Committee are Lawrence D. Ackman, 
Stephen Berger, Seth Bernstein, Larry Bettino, Lawrence B. Buttenwieser, Karen Daly, Evan 
A. Davis, Stephen DeGroat, Cheryl Cohen Effron, Roger Einiger, David Elliman, Laurel 
FitzPatrick, Bud H. Gibbs, Kenneth D. Gibbs, James F. Haddon, Jeffrey Halis, Walter 
Harris, Patricia Hassett, H. Dale Hemmerdinger, Fred P. Hochberg, Brian T. Horey, Eugene 
J. Keilin, Peter Kiernan, Peter C. Kornman, Robert Kurtter, Stephen F. Langowski, Richard 
A. Levine, Jeffrey Lynford, Norman N. Mintz, Lester Pollack, Carol Raphael, Heather Ruth, 
Edward L. Sadowsky, Teddy Selinger, Andrew Sidamon-Eristoff, Adam Solomon, Joan 
Steinberg, Merryl H. Tisch, Cynthia King Vance, Mark Wager, Kevin Willens, Nancy 
Winkler, James L. Lipscomb, ex-officio.   
     
This paper is the final in a series of three prepared for public forums during the Fall of 2007 
on the upcoming State budget for fiscal year 2008-09. These forums are a continuation of 
the CBC’s commitment to promote reforms in the content and process of the New York 
State budget.  Previous research reports were prepared for conferences held in Palisdes, New 
York in November 2003 and in Armonk, New York in April 2006. 
 
Tammy Pels, Research Associate, prepared this report with direction and editorial guidance 
from Charles Brecher, Executive Vice President and Research Director, and Elizabeth 
Lynam, Deputy Research Director, and research support from Senior Research Associate 
Selma Mustovic and Research Associates Darcie Harvey and Maria Doulis.  The authors and 
the Committee are grateful to Paul Francis, Director of the New York State Division of the 
Budget, and members of the Division staff for their cooperation in research for the paper 
and for their helpful comments on a preliminary draft of this paper.  We also thank the New 
York State Office of the Comptroller, New York City Independent Budget Office, New 
York City Office of Management and Budget, and New York State Senate Finance 
Committee for their assistance and thoughtful feedback on the paper.  Corey Kunz, 
Communications and Public Affairs Associate at CBC, formatted the document for 
publication.  
 
   
Alfredo S. Quintero    Alair Townsend 
Co-Chair     Co-Chair 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The months between the fall of 2007 and the adoption of New York State’s next annual 
budget in March 2008 are a critical juncture in the efforts to “fix Albany.”  The process by 
which the next budget is prepared and debated, as well as the substantive decisions it 
embodies, are critical to the movement for political and fiscal reform in New York State. 
 
In order to promote fiscal reform, the Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) is convening 
three separate agenda-setting conferences for key stakeholders in the state budget process.  
Each session will focus on one aspect of fiscal reform with a goal of identifying specific 
changes that are assigned high priority for the coming budget cycle by a wide range of 
interested parties.  The expectation is that the priority measures can begin to be 
implemented in the course of adopting the fiscal year 2008-09 budget. The first session was 
held on September 20 at the Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany; the second was 
held on October 17 at Milano The New School for Management and Urban Policy in New 
York City.  The third will be held at the Rockefeller Institute on December 6.  
 
The three dimensions of fiscal reform considered at the respective sessions are: 
1. Greater accountability and transparency in fiscal decision making. 
2. More effective use of state fiscal resources. 
3. More equitable and affordable local tax burdens. 
 
This background paper focuses on the third issue.  It has been prepared to inform discussion 
among the participants at the third CBC agenda-setting conference on December 6. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections.  The first describes state and 
local taxes in New York and compares the burden to competitor locations in the nation.  
This section highlights differences between New York City and the rest of the State, as well 
as changes in the tax burden since the mid-1990s.  The second section focuses on local 
government taxation, with an emphasis on the property tax burden outside of New York 
City.  This portion of the paper describes four problems facing these local governments.   
The third section describes recent state actions taken to lower the local tax burden and offers 
a critique of the School Tax Relief (STAR) program.  The last section presents options for 
the State to address the local tax burden.  It distinguishes among options meant to: 1) limit 
local taxation; 2) more equitably distribute the local tax burden; and 3) address the factors 
driving up the cost of local services.   
 
Conference participants are asked to review these options as they will form the basis for 
discussion at the forum. 
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OVERVIEW OF NEW YORK’S TAXES 
 
New Yorkers pay about $111 billion annually in state and local taxes.  As shown in Figure 1, 
taxes collected by local governments represent 55 percent of the total, and state taxes 
account for 45 percent.   
 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances 2004-2005.
Figure 1
State and Local Tax Collections
Fiscal Year 2004-05
(dollars in millions)
State Taxes,  
$50,190 
Local Taxes,  
$60,917 
Business 
Income 
Taxes,  $2,785 
Other Taxes,  
$3,144 
General Sales 
Tax,  $11,004 
Other 
Consumption 
Taxes,  $5,158 
Personal 
Income Tax,  
$28,100 
Property Tax,  
$34,150 
Business 
Income 
Taxes,  $4,209 
Personal 
Income Tax,  
$6,744 
Other 
Consumption 
Taxes,  $1,717 
General Sales 
Tax,  $10,097 
Other Taxes,  
$4,000 
 
 
The state government derives more than half (56 percent) its tax revenue from its personal 
income tax.  New York levies a graduated income tax, with rates ranging from 4 to 6.85 
percent across five different brackets.  The state sales tax – at a current rate of 4 percent – 
generates 22 percent of state tax revenue.  The state’s business income taxes generate 6 
percent of the total.  New York State generates additional tax revenue from its cigarette and 
tobacco product tax, alcoholic beverage tax, motor fuel tax, estate tax, real property transfer 
tax, mortgage recording tax and hotel tax, among others.  
 
Local jurisdictions in New York collect $61 billion in taxes.  Property taxes account for 56 
percent of this total.  Local personal and business income taxes – almost entirely collected in 
New York City – add up to 18 percent of all local taxes.  Local sales taxes contribute another 
17 percent. 
 
The local tax structure in New York City differs from that in local communities outside the 
City in three ways (see Figure 2).  First, unlike almost every other locality in the State, the 
City levies a personal income tax on its residents; this tax generates about $7 billion annually.  
Second, the City taxes businesses more heavily than other localities.  Unlike other 
jurisdictions, the City imposes business income taxes, and its property tax places a 
disproportionately high burden on commercial property relative to residential property.  The 
City’s business income taxes generate about $4 billion annually, and commercial property 
accounts for about 52 percent of its total property tax levy1 compared to about 40 percent in 
                                                 
1 New York City Department of Finance, Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Property Tax Report.  Includes Class 3 
(utility) and Class 4 (all other non-residential) properties.  
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the rest of the State.2  Third, New York City has a thriving tourism sector and is able to 
derive substantial tax revenue from these visitors.  The City has a significant hotel tax and 
some of its sales tax revenues are derived from purchases by non-residents. 
 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances 2004-2005.
Figure 2
Composition of Local Tax Revenue
Fiscal Year 2005
(dollars in millions)
New York City 
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General Property 
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Outside of New York City, local governments are highly dependent on property and sales 
taxes.  In these jurisdictions, property taxes comprise 77 percent of all local revenue.  
General sales taxes generate almost the entire remainder – about 19 percent. 
 
Local governments levy property taxes at five different levels – county, city or village, town, 
special district and school district.  Special districts include fire, sanitation, sewer and library.  
School districts generate 58 percent of all property tax revenue (68 percent when School Tax 
Relief or STAR payments are included), and counties account for another 19 percent (see 
Figure 3). 
 
Local sales tax rates range from 3 to 5 percent and are levied largely at the county level.  
State statute permits local sales tax rates up to 3 percent; rates exceeding the state limit 
require state legislative approval.  As of July 2007, only six counties of the 57 counties 
outside New York City (Hamilton, St. Lawrence, Warren, Saratoga, Washington, and 
Westchester) levy a 3 percent local sales tax, while the rate in five counties (Nassau, Suffolk, 
Allegany, Erie, and Oneida) exceeds 4 percent.  Oneida has the highest rate at 5 percent.3  
Purchases in Suffolk, Nassau, Westchester, Rockland, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam and New 
York City are subject to an additional 0.375 percent sales tax that is dedicated to the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority.   
                                                 
2 Robert Ward (Business Council of New York State). New York’s Property Taxes Are High, and Rising Fast.  
Why – And What to do About It? April 2007. 
3 Office of the New York State Comptroller, Financial Report on Counties, Fiscal Years Ending 2005, July 
2007. 
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Source: New York State Office of the Comptroller, Local Government Division, Summary of Financial Data for Local 
Governments, 2005. 
Figure 3
New York State (Excluding New York City) Property Tax Levy 
By Level of Local Government 
Fiscal Year 2005
Total Property Tax Levy = $23 Billion
Special District
7%
Town
8%
City or Village
8%
School District 
(without STAR)
58%
County
19%
 
 
 
Growth in State and Local Taxes 
 
From fiscal year 1995 to 2005, state tax collections increased 46 percent, New York City tax 
collections grew 78 percent, and local tax collections outside New York City rose 53 percent 
(see Table 1).  As a benchmark, during the same time inflation in the New York 
metropolitan region pushed up consumer prices about 30 percent and personal income in 
New York grew 56 percent.4   
 
The relatively slow growth in state taxes is due to policy decisions during this period to lower 
tax rates.  Beginning in fiscal year 1995, a series of state tax reductions lowered tax 
collections about $13.4 billion annually, including an $8 billion cut to the state personal 
income tax and a $3.5 billion reduction in business income taxes.5  
 
The relatively rapid growth in New York City taxes is due to a combination of strong 
economic growth and tax increases.  In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the City 
increased the real property tax 18.5 percent, with some rebates for residential property 
enacted subsequently.  From 2003 to 2005, the City also temporarily increased the personal 
income tax rate for high-income filers and raised the sales tax rate from 4 to 4.125 percent.  
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculated from “Annual Consumer Price Index – All 
Urban Consumers for New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island Area.”  U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Personal income growth is from calendar year 1994 to calendar year 2004.   
5 New York State Division of the Budget. 2006-07 Executive Budget Economic and Revenue Outlook, 
“Summary of State Tax Reduction Program.” 
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Nominal 
Growth 
1995 
1
2005 
1
1995-2005
Total State and Local Taxes $71,321 $111,108 56%
State Taxes $34,294 $50,190 46%
Personal Income Tax 17,589 28,100 60%
Business Income Taxes 2,815 2,785  (1%)
General Sales Tax 6,845 11,004 61%
Other Taxes 7,045 8,302 18%
New York City Taxes $17,533 $31,132 78%
General Property Tax 
2, 3
7,530 11,839 57%
Personal Income Tax 
4
3,642 6,732 85%
Business Income Taxes 2,170 4,211 94%
General Sales Tax 2,621 4,375 67%
Other Taxes 
5
1,569 3,974 153%
Local Taxes Outside New York City $19,493 $29,786 53%
General Property Tax 
3
15,252 22,311 46%
Personal Income Tax 24 11  (53%)
Business Income Taxes 0 0 NAP
General Sales Tax 3,350 5,722 71%
Other Taxes 
5
867 1,741 101%
(dollars in millions)
Table 1
New York
State and Local Tax Collection
Fiscal Years 1995 and 2005
(1) Fiscal years for state and local governments do not align.  Data used from fiscal years ending between July 
1, 2004 and June 30, 2005.  The New York State fiscal year ends March 31.  The New York City fiscal year 
ends June 30.  The fiscal year end-date for other local governments in New York State vary among March 31, 
June 30 and December 31.  Thus, some data for local governments outside the City represent the 1994 and 
2004 fiscal years.
(2) Census data for New York City property taxes in fiscal year 2005 include $152 million from School Tax 
Relief (STAR) revenues. 
(4) Census data for the New York City personal income tax in fiscal year 2005 includes $632 million from 
STAR revenues and does not include $497 million retained for the Transitional Finance Authority.  The 
personal income tax for fiscal year 2005 would be $6,597 million if STAR was excluded and the TFA retention 
was included. 
Total Tax Collection
Note: The New York region experienced 30 percent inflation from June 1995 to June 2005.  New York 
personal income increased 56 percent from calendar year 1994 to calendar year 2004.
(5) Other tax revenue includes taxes on alcohol and tobacco sales, public utilities, hotel sales, and fuel, as well 
as the real property transfer tax and mortgage recording tax. Other tax revenue also includes fees on licenses. 
NAP=Not Applicable.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances: 1994-1995 and 2004-2005.
(3) Census data for property taxes include penalties and interest on real estate taxes. 
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Outside of New York City, property tax collections grew 46 percent; local sales taxes rose 71 
percent.  The increase in sales taxes is jointly due to economic growth and rate increases.  
From 1995 to 2005, 33 out of 57 counties outside New York City increased their county 
sales tax rates.6  The increases varied from 0.5 base points in Allegany County to two base 
points in Delaware County.  
 
 
New York’s Comparative Tax Burden 
 
New York State has been among the states with the highest tax burden for several decades. 
New York was second only to Maine or Alaska in the early 1990s and had the nation’s 
highest burden in the late 1990s and in some recent years.  In the latest year for which data 
are available (fiscal year 2005) New York ranked second to Wyoming.7  In fiscal year 2005, 
New York collected $150 for every $1,000 of personal income, 33 percent higher than the 
national average and well-above the nine other most populous states and neighboring 
competitors Connecticut, New Jersey, and Massachusetts (see Table 2).  The tax burden in 
Connecticut and New Jersey is only 6 and 4 percent above the national average, respectively.   
 
Per $1,000 
Personal 
Income
Percent of 
U.S. 
Average Rank
Per $1,000 
Personal 
Income
Percent of 
U.S. 
Average Rank
Per $1,000 
Personal 
Income
Percent of 
U.S. Average Rank
New York $150 133% 2 $68 101% 30 $82 179% 1
Connecticut 119 106% 11 73 109% 20 46 101% 16
Ohio 118 105% 12 68 102% 28 50 110% 8
New Jersey 117 104% 15 63 94% 36 54 118% 3
California 116 103% 16 78 116% 13 38 83% 33
Pennsylvania 111 99% 25 66 99% 33 45 99% 18
Illinios 111 99% 26 60 89% 41 51 112% 6
Michigan 110 98% 27 73 110% 19 37 80% 35
North Carolina 108 96% 32 74 110% 17 34 75% 36
Massachusetts 107 95% 34 67 100% 31 40 87% 30
Florida 106 94% 36 60 90% 40 46 100% 17
Georgia 104 92% 40 59 89% 43 45 97% 22
Texas 100 89% 44 47 71% 47 53 115% 4
U.S. Average $113 100% NAP $67 100% NAP $46 100% NAP
Note: Calculated as fiscal year taxes divided by prior year personal income.
Does not include the District of Columbia. 
Competitor states are the 10 most populous states plus Connecticut, New Jersey and Massachusetts.
NAP = Not Applicable.
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances: 2004-2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Table 2
State and Local Taxes per $1,000 of Personal Income
Fiscal Year 2004-05
Combined State and Local Taxes State Taxes Local Taxes
New York and Selected Competitor States
 
 
New York’s high tax burden is due to unusually high local taxes.  In New York, state taxes 
are $68 per $1,000 of personal income, – just 1 percent higher than the national average – 
                                                 
6 Office of the New York State Comptroller, Division of Local Government Services and Economic 
Development, Local Government Sales Taxes in New York State, March 2006. 
7 Wyoming, like Alaska and several other states, derives significant revenues from severance taxes levied on 
minerals extracted in the state. The incidence of these taxes falls largely on non-residents who purchase the 
minerals.  If severance taxes are excluded, Wyoming no longer ranks as a high-tax state.  
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while local taxes represent $82 per $1,000 of personal income – 79 percent higher than the 
national average.  New York ranks 30th for its state tax burden but number one for the 
highest local tax burden. 
 
Among New York’s state taxes, the sales tax is below the national average (see Table 3).   
However, the state personal income tax in New York yields $15 more for every $1,000 of 
personal income than the national average.  Compared to the 40 other states that levy a 
personal income tax on wages and salaries, New York’s maximum income tax rate is higher 
than 23 states.8  Because New Yorkers reach the top income bracket at $40,000 for joint 
filers, 37 percent of state taxpayers are subject to the top income rate.9      
 
United 
States
New York 
State
New York 
City
Rest of 
the State 
New York 
State
New York 
City
Rest of 
the State 
Total $113 $150 NAP NAP $37 NAP NAP
State Taxes $67 $68 NAP NAP $1 NAP NAP
Property Tax 1 0 NAP NAP (1) NAP NAP
Personal Income Tax 23 38 NAP NAP 15 NAP NAP
Business Income Taxes 4 4 NAP NAP (0) NAP NAP
General Sales Tax 22 15 NAP NAP (7) NAP NAP
Other Taxes 17 11 NAP NAP (6) NAP NAP
Local Taxes $46 $82 $94 $72 $36 $49 $26
Property Tax 33 46 36 54 13 3 21
Personal Income Tax 2 9 20 0 7 18 (2)
Business Income Taxes 0 6 13 0 5 12 (0)
General Sales Tax 5 14 13 14 8 8 9
Other Taxes 5 8 12 4 3 7 (1)
NAP=Not Applicable.
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances: 2004-2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Difference from U.S.
Table 3
State and Local Tax Collection per $1,000 Personal Income
Fiscal Year 2005
New York and National Average
 
 
New York’s high local tax burden stems from three major sources.  Its localities collect $13 
per $1,000 of personal income more than the national average in property taxes; $12 more in 
personal and business income taxes; and $8 more in sales taxes.  However, because tax 
structure varies between New York City and the rest of New York State, the source of the 
high local tax burden also varies between the City and other localities.  Both locations share 
a relatively high sales tax burden, but the similarities end there.  New York City’s high tax 
burden is largely explained by high personal and business income taxes, while the rest of the 
State’s high tax burden results from high property taxes.  The City’s personal and business 
income taxes yield $30 more per $1,000 of personal income than the national average; in the 
                                                 
8 District of Columbia, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the District of Columbia 
– A Nationwide Comparison for 2005, Issued August 2006.  Two other states – New Hampshire and Tennessee – 
levy a personal income tax on dividend income and interest only. 
9 New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Office of Tax Policy Analysis, Analysis of 2004 Personal 
Income Tax Returns: Profile of Income, Deductions, Credits and Tax, June 2007. CBC staff calculation. 
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rest of the State, property taxes claim $21 more per $1,000 of personal income than the 
national average.   
 
Although the local tax burden in New York City is higher than the rest of New York, if the 
City were excluded, New York State would still rank number one for the highest local tax 
burden in the nation with a burden of $72 per $1,000 personal income.  The next highest 
state is Maine with a local tax burden of $55 per $1,000 of personal income.  
 
Amount
Percent of U.S. 
Average
National Rank 
(1 = Highest)
New York State $46 134% 7
New York City $36 104% NAP
Outside New York City $54 157% NAP
New Jersey 53 153% 4
Connecticut 45 131% 8
Texas 44 127% 10
Illinios 42 122% 11
Michigan 40 117% 13
Massachusetts 39 112% 16
Florida 36 104% 20
Ohio 34 98% 21
Pennsylvania 32 94% 24
Georgia 31 90% 28
California 27 78% 38
North Carolina 26 74% 39
U.S. Average $35 100% NAP
Does not include District of Columbia. 
Competitor states are the 10 most populous states plus Connecticut, New Jersey and Massachusetts.
NAP=Not Applicable.
Note: Calculated as fiscal year taxes divided by prior year personal income.
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances: 2004-2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Table 4
Property Taxes per $1,000 of Personal Income
Fiscal Year 2004-05
New York and Selected Competitor States
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Outside New York City, the major source of local taxes is the property tax, and the property 
tax burden is especially high in these jurisdictions (see Table 4).  Excluding New York City 
the New York burden is $54 per $1,000 of personal income, a figure 57 percent above the 
national average.  Among competitor states, only New Jersey comes close to this level.  
Excluding the City, New York has the 4th highest property tax burden in the nation. 
 
Changes in State and Local Tax Burdens 
 
From fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 2005, the combined state and local tax burden in New 
York remained flat at $150 per $1,000 of personal income, but two more subtle trends were 
evident (see Table 5).  First, the burden shifted from the state to the local level; the state’s 
share of the burden fell 6 percent while the localities’ share rose 6 percent.  As noted earlier, 
the cuts at the state level brought state taxes more in line with national averages.  Second, the 
earlier part of this period saw the burden fall, while the later years experienced an increase. 
Perhaps the more recent increase concentrated at the local level is a partial cause of the 
recent concern with the local tax burden.  
 
In both New York City and other localities, the increase in burden has occurred in the five 
most recent years.  In New York City the increase more than offset reductions in the earlier 
years, while the net change was a slight decline in other jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, in recent 
years all localities experienced a growing burden.  
 
 
Issues with Measuring Tax Burdens 
 
It is important to note that the measure of tax burden used above may overstate New York’s 
relative burden.  Although “taxes per $1,000 of personal income” adjusts for ability to pay, it 
does not account for disparities in nonresident tax collections among states.  Total tax 
collections include taxes paid by nonresidents and visitors, but personal income does not 
include nonresident income.  Nonresident and part-time residents account for more than 16 
percent of the New York State personal income tax,10 and New York City’s tourism industry 
adds significantly to sales and other consumption tax revenue.  Moreover, personal income 
does not include income from capital gains – a significant source of income for some New 
Yorkers.  The measure of tax burden also does not account for the deductibility of certain 
state and local taxes from federal taxes.  In addition, the measure does not reflect who 
ultimately pays the tax.  While individuals pay residential property taxes and personal income 
taxes, taxes on businesses draw down corporate profits and may ultimately decrease income 
for owners, employees, or shareholders.  The ultimate payers of business taxes may also be 
non-residents.  Some analysts include business income in the definition of the tax base to 
adjust for greater taxable resources in localities with strong commercial sectors.11  Finally, 
this measure of tax burden does not adjust for the progressivity of various state and local tax 
structures.  A state with more progressive income taxes will collect relatively more taxes 
when the economy grows and less taxes when the economy contracts.   
                                                 
10 New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Office of Tax Policy Analysis, Analysis of 2004 Personal 
Income Tax Returns.  
11 The New York City Independent Budget Office defines “taxable resources” as resident household income 
plus local business net income in, Comparing State and Local Taxes in Large U.S. Cities, February 2007. 
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FY 1995 FY 2000 FY 2005 1995-2000 2000-2005 1995-2005
Total $150 $140 $150  (6%) 7%  (0%)
State Taxes $72 $67 $68  (7%) 0%  (6%)
Personal Income Tax $37 $37 $38 1% 1% 2%
Business Income Taxes $6 $4 $4  (24%)  (16%)  (37%)
General Sales Tax $14 $14 $15  (4%) 7% 3%
Other Taxes $15 $12 $11  (21%)  (4%)  (24%)
Local Taxes $78 $73 $82  (6%) 13% 6%
Property Tax $48 $41 $46  (15%) 13%  (4%)
Personal Income Tax $8 $9 $9 15% 3% 19%
Business Income Taxes $5 $5 $6 16% 7% 24%
General Sales Tax $13 $13 $14 2% 7% 8%
Other Taxes $5 $5 $8 3% 45% 49%
New York City Taxes $85 $82 $94  (3%) 15% 12%
General Property Tax $36 $29 $36  (21%) 25%  (1%)
Personal Income Tax $18 $20 $20 12% 4% 16%
Business Income Taxes $10 $12 $13 14% 7% 22%
General Sales Tax $13 $13 $13 1% 4% 5%
Other Taxes $8 $9 $12 15% 39% 59%
Local Taxes Outside New York City $73 $66 $72  (10%) 10%  (1%)
General Property Tax $57 $50 $54  (12%) 8%  (5%)
General Sales Tax $12 $13 $14 2% 9% 11%
Other Taxes $3 $3 $4  (19%) 61% 31%
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances: 1994-1995, 1999-2000 and 2004-2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Amount Percent Change
Table 5
State of New York
State and Local Tax Collection per $1,000 Personal Income
Fiscal Years 1994-95, 1999-00 and 2004-05
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LOCAL TAX ISSUES 
 
New York State’s high and distinctive tax burden creates problems for its local governments. 
Four issues are particularly important. 
 
1. The heavy reliance on local property taxes to finance public schools creates 
inequities in the resources available to students and the burdens placed on school 
district taxpayers. 
2. County governments have faced a financial squeeze due to the State’s Medicaid 
mandate and other factors, and this has led to increases in county tax bills. 
3. Fragmentation of local government responsibilities leads to unnecessarily high costs 
for some services. 
4. Local governments do not manage their labor costs effectively, in part due to state 
mandates relating to collective bargaining. 
 
 
Inequities in School Finance 
 
Because property taxes are the largest single source of funding for school districts (outside of 
New York City), the amount each district is able to spend per pupil is largely determined by 
property wealth within the district.  School districts that enjoy high property values are able 
to levy relatively low tax rates and generate high funding for their schools.  Conversely, 
school districts with low property values are forced to levy high property tax rates yet raise 
little school funding.  As a result, spending levels per pupil vary greatly within New York. 
 
The New York State Education Department reports that among the 10 percent of districts 
that spend the least per pupil the average value of property per pupil is $184,799.  In 
contrast, the 10 percent of school districts that spend the most per pupil enjoy average 
property values of $1,422,470 per pupil.12  In Erie County, school districts’ average spending 
is about $13,000 per student while in Westchester County, average spending per student tops 
$21,000.  These disparities exist even after the allocation of state education aid, which partly 
(but only partly) counteracts the inequities of the property tax by favoring lower-income 
communities.   
 
Table 6 illustrates these inequities using data from 14 selected school districts. The 
communities include New York City, the state’s other large urban school districts (Buffalo, 
Rochester, Syracuse, Yonkers, Binghamton, Utica and Albany), one upstate rural district 
(Massena), one upstate suburban district (Saratoga Springs), two wealthy suburban districts 
(Great Neck and Scarsdale), and two poor downstate suburban districts (Roosevelt and 
Mount Vernon).  
 
                                                 
12 New York State Education Department, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit, Analysis of School Finances in New 
York State School Districts 2004-05, January 2007. 
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Local Tax 
Local School Tax 
Effort Local Revenue Total Revenue 
District Pupils Base per Pupil (per $1,000 Tax Base) per Pupil per Pupil
New York City 1,043,816 $603,564 $12.03 $7,259 $15,025
"Big 4" Cities
Buffalo 43,329 193,292 11.48 2,219 14,871
Rochester 36,613 192,680 16.15 3,112 15,356
Syracuse 22,957 217,072 14.19 3,081 15,028
Yonkers 24,118 789,315 7.58 5,980 18,203
Other Upstate Urban
Binghamton 6,311 310,059 13.68 4,243 12,469
Utica 9,169 184,647 12.56 2,319 12,010
Albany 10,482 465,407 19.54 9,093 16,994
Upstate Rural
Massena 2,875 329,183 15.26 5,023 12,970
Upstate Suburban
Saratoga Springs 6,878 673,550 11.37 7,658 13,319
Wealthy Downstate Suburban
Great Neck 6,262 2,395,304 8.68 20,786 23,489
Scarsdale 4,714 2,394,917 7.71 18,460 21,688
Poor Downstate Suburban
Roosevelt 3,116 398,078 10.98 4,373 17,932
Mount Vernon 9,976 564,498 11.86 6,693 15,860
New York State 2,848,242 $645,404 $11.79 $7,608 $15,118
Note: Tax Base is an equally weighted average of personal income and real property values.
School Year 2004-2005
Fiscal Characteristics of Selected School Districts
Table 6
Source: New York State Department of Education, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit, School District Fiscal Profiles, Masterfile for 2004-
2005.
 
 
The selected communities with the highest tax bases – an equally weighted measure of 
personal income and property wealth – enjoy the lowest school tax efforts and the highest 
revenues per pupil.  In the wealthy district of Scarsdale, the local school tax effort is $7.71 – 
35 percent below the state average – and locally-funded spending per pupil is $18,460 – 
nearly two and a half times higher than the state average.  In contrast, in Rochester, the local 
school tax effort is $16.15, but the city generates only $3,112 per pupil.  As a result, even 
after state aid which strongly favors low-wealth districts, Scarsdale spends $21,688 on each 
student while Rochester spends $15,356.  
 
 
The Counties’ Tax Squeeze 
 
In fiscal year 2005 New York’s 57 counties (excluding New York City) spent $18.7 billion, a 
sum that grew 41 percent or nearly $5.4 billion in ten years (see Table 7).  The major source 
of spending growth was county police services, especially in Nassau and Suffolk counties, 
and Medicaid.  These two counties accounted for more than half the growth in county 
spending on police ($781 million) over the decade.   
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FY 1995 FY 2005 Change
Percent of 
Total Change
Total Revenues $12,388 $17,524 $5,135 100%
Sales Tax 2,514 4,621 2,107 41%
Property Tax 3,165 4,385 1,220 24%
State Aid 1,916 2,687 771 15%
Federal Aid 1,538 1,885 347 7%
Other Taxes 198 323 125 2%
Other Government Aid 269 353 84 2%
Other Revenues 2,789 3,270 481 9%
Total Expenditures $13,329 $18,724 $5,395 100%
Police 1,567 2,868 1,301 24%
Medicaid 1,255 2,156 901 17%
General Government 1,585 2,482 897 17%
Economic Assistance (Excluding Medicaid) 3,170 3,696 526 10%
Transportation 873 1,333 461 9%
Education 616 998 382 7%
Utilities 378 659 281 5%
Culture-Recreation 239 353 113 2%
Fire 25 59 33 1%
Debt Service and Repayments 814 1,174 360 7%
Other Expenditures 2,807 2,946 138 3%
Source: New York State Office of the Comptroller, Financial Data for Local Governments; CBC Staff Calculations.
Table 7
Drivers of County Revenue and Expenditure Growth
Excluding New York City
State Fiscal Year 1995 to 2005
(dollars in millions)
Note: Data is not intended to provide detailed accounting or legal information concerning county finances.  In any given year, total 
revenues and expenditures may not add due to the exclusion of other financing sources such as borrowings or the appropriation of fund 
balances.  The fact that changes in revenues is less than changes in expenditures does not signify operating deficits.
 
 
Unlike spending for police services, Medicaid is a mandate for the counties.  The State 
requires counties to pay half the nonfederal share (or 25 percent of the total) of spending for 
acute services for beneficiaries in their county and 10 percent of the total cost of long-term 
care services for county beneficiaries.  In fiscal year 2005 these Medicaid mandates required 
$2.2 billion from the counties (excluding New York City), about 12 percent of the counties’ 
total spending.  These Medicaid costs grew 72 percent over the previous decade, accounting 
for about 17 percent of the total growth in county spending. 
 
Counties were able to finance their growing expenses primarily in two ways.  First, sales tax 
receipts grew significantly, increasing about 84 percent over the decade.  As of 2006, New 
York has the fourth highest average combined state and local sales tax rate – 8.25 percent 
compared to a national average of 5.93 percent.13  Second, county property tax collections 
                                                 
13 Tennessee, Louisiana and Washington have higher average combined state and local sales tax rates.  Office of 
the New York State Comptroller, Division of Local Government Services and Economic Development, Local 
Government Sales Taxes in New York State, March 2006.  
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outside the City grew 39 percent.  Much of this growth was related to increasing property 
values, but the growth in property values was uneven among the counties. 
 
Full Property Value FY 1995 FY 2005
Percent 
Growth FY 1995 FY 2005
Percent 
Growth
New York State $806,458 $1,433,393 78% $806,458 $1,433,393 78%
New York City 279,791 490,816 75% 279,791 490,816 75%
NYC Suburbs 
1
308,454 673,741 118% 308,454 673,741 118%
All Other Counties 218,213 268,836 23% 218,213 268,836 23%
Personal Income
New York State $475,979 $742,209 56% $475,979 $742,209 56%
New York City 207,456 329,583   59% 207,456 329,583   59%
NYC Suburbs 
1
142,502 231,255 62% 142,502 231,255 62%
All Other Counties 126,020 181,371 44% 126,020 181,371 44%
Property Tax Levy
New York State $23,616 $35,261 49% $11,055 $16,953 53%
New York City 7,890 12,568 59% 7,890 12,568 59%
NYC Suburbs 
1
9,200 14,358 56% 1,568 2,420 54%
All Other Counties 6,526 8,334 28% 1,597 1,965 23%
Full Value Tax Rate (per $1,000 value)
New York State $29 $25  (16%) $14 $12  (14%)
New York City 28 26  (9%) 28 26  (9%)
NYC Suburbs 
1
30 21  (29%) 5 4  (29%)
All Other Counties 30 31 4% 7 7  (0%)
Tax Burden (per $1,000 income)
New York State $50 $48  (4%) $23 $23  (2%)
New York City 38 38 0% 38 38 0%
NYC Suburbs 
1
65 62  (4%) 11 10  (5%)
All Other Counties 52 46  (11%) 13 11  (15%)
Table 8
 Full Value Tax Rate and Property Tax Burden Growth
By Region and by All Local Governments and County Only
Fiscal Years 1995 to 2005
(1) Includes: Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, Ulster and Westchester Counties. 
Sources: Office of the New York State Comptroller, Local Government Issues in Focus, Vol 2 No 2, Property Taxes in New York State, 
April 2006. STAR values from New York State Education Department, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research 
Unit, School District Fiscal Profiles, Masterfile for 2004-2005.
(dollars in millions, unless otherwise noted)
All Local Governments County Only
Note: Property tax levy does not include School Tax Relief (STAR) reimbursements to the school districts.
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Aggregate property values in the state grew 78 percent from fiscal year 1995 to 2005 (see 
Table 8).  Due to this rapid rise, the full value or effective property tax rate in the State in 
fact decreased 14 percent at the county level.  However, downstate counties that experienced 
large growth in property values – including Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, 
Suffolk, Ulster and Westchester – greatly distort the average.  For these counties, property 
values rose 118 percent and their effective county property tax rate fell 29 percent.  In 
contrast, in counties outside of the downstate suburbs, property values increased only 23 
percent and the effective county property tax rate remained stagnant.   
 
However, it is important to note that, measured as a share of personal income, the total 
property tax burden – including school district, town, village and special district taxes – is 
significantly higher downstate than upstate.  In fiscal year 2005, the property tax burden in 
New York City’s suburbs was 35 percent higher than in the upstate counties.  In these 
wealthier downstate counties, strong property value growth has enabled the counties to 
lower rates, yet the magnitude of their levies still results in extraordinarily high property tax 
burdens.  Consequently, although all counties in New York bear high property tax burdens, 
as a result of divergent economies upstate and downstate, the state’s counties have had 
dissimilar experiences with changing property values, levies, rates and burdens.   
 
 
Local Governments Fragmentation 
 
Nationally, the United States is known for its multiple levels of government and highly 
decentralized and fragmented network of local governments.  While sometimes defended for 
its greater accountability, this fragmented system is also seen as a source of inefficiency and 
high costs.   
 
The U.S. Census counts 3,421 units of local government in New York State, with only three 
of those units in New York City.14  Excluding New York City, New York has 3.12 units of 
government per 10,000 residents, 10 percent less than the national average (see Table 9).  
Out of 50 states, New York has the 34th highest number of local governments per capita if 
New York City is included and 28th highest if the City is excluded.  Despite New York’s 
average ranking, excluding New York City, the State has nearly 84 percent more local 
governments than Connecticut and New Jersey, adjusted for population.  Out of 12 
competitor states, New York has a higher ratio of government units to population than eight 
other states.  Compared to these selected states, New York has the third highest proportion 
of school districts to population and the fifth highest proportion of special districts to 
population.  Moreover, local governments have expressed strong opposition to 
consolidation efforts.  Local backlash against consolidation of government units poses a 
significant challenge to state efforts to reduce fragmentation.  
 
                                                 
14
 The New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness counts over 800 
more units of local government than the U.S. Census.  The units in the Commission count but not in the 
Census count are: dependent school districts including districts in the “Big Five” cities, community colleges, 
boards of cooperative education services (BOCES), housing authorities, industrial development agencies 
(IDAs), soil and water conservation districts, urban renewal or community development authorities, county 
health districts, certain water and sewer authorities, parking authorities, and off-track betting corporations.  To 
ensure uniformity, in this paper Census data is utilized to compare New York to other states in the nation. 
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State
County General 
Purpose
Sub-County 
General Purpose
School 
Districts
Special 
Districts All Units
50-State 
Rank 
1
New York 0.03 0.81 0.36 0.60 1.80 34
New York (excluding New York City) 0.05 1.41 0.62 1.03 3.12 28
Illinois 0.08 2.19 0.75 2.53 5.56 15
Pennsylvania 0.05 2.09 0.42 1.53 4.10 23
Ohio 0.08 1.98 0.59 0.56 3.20 27
Michigan 0.08 1.79 0.58 0.37 2.82 29
Texas 0.12 0.57 0.52 1.08 2.29 33
Georgia 0.19 0.65 0.22 0.71 1.77 35
Connecticut 0.00 0.53 0.05 1.13 1.70 37
New Jersey 0.02 0.67 0.65 0.33 1.68 38
Massachusetts 0.01 0.55 0.13 0.63 1.32 40
California 0.02 0.14 0.31 0.84 1.30 41
North Carolina 0.12 0.67 0.00 0.40 1.19 43
Florida 0.04 0.25 0.06 0.39 0.75 47
U.S. Average 0.12 1.43 0.54 1.39 3.47 NAP
Note: Population as of April 1, 2000.
Competitor states are the 10 most populous states plus Connecticut, New Jersey and Massachusetts.
(1) 50-State Rank outside New York does not include "New York State (excluding New York City)."
NAP = Not Applicable.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Census of Governments: Organization Phase. 
Table 9
Number of Local Governments Per 10,000 Residents
New York and Selected Competitor States
Fiscal Year 2001-2002
 
 
 
High Labor Costs for Local Governments 
 
A major reason for the high cost of local government in New York is the relatively high cost 
of labor.  New York’s local governments have relatively more workers than do jurisdictions 
in other states, and they pay their workers more than do other localities. 
 
Excluding New York City, New York localities employ 459 workers for every 10,000 
residents compared to an average of 395 nationwide (see Table 10).  Wyoming is the only 
state that employees more local workers per capita than New York.  Neighboring New 
Jersey and Connecticut employ 392 and 329 local government employees per 10,000 
residents, respectively, placing them well below New York. 
 
Local governments in New York also pay workers higher wages than other jurisdictions.  If 
New York City is included, the average wage in New York among local governments is the 
highest in the nation, exceeding the national average by 30 percent.  If New York City is 
excluded, the average falls notably, but that average is still 8.5 percent more than the national 
average, $44,536 versus $41,040.  However, competitor states California, New Jersey, 
Connecticut and Massachusetts pay higher local government employee wages than New 
York State excluding New York City.  
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State Total State Local
50-State Rank - 
Local FTEs 
1
Average Annual 
Local Pay 
2
50-State Rank - 
Average Local 
Pay 
1
New York 621 132 489 2 $53,520 1
New York (excluding local NYC employees) NA NA 459 2 $44,536 10
Texas 573 124 450 3 33,732 33
Ohio 533 121 412 4 39,444 20
Georgia 554 144 411 5 33,996 32
California 506 108 398 8 52,680 2
Illinois 510 116 394 10 43,392 12
New Jersey 565 172 392 11 50,952 3
Michigan 504 142 362 16 44,304 11
Florida 472 111 361 17 37,908 22
Massachusetts 510 148 361 18 44,700 10
Connecticut 522 193 329 20 47,580 7
Pennsylvania 449 127 321 22 42,360 13
North Carolina 296 62 233 41 35,088 29
U.S. Average 541 146 395 NAP $41,040 NAP
Note: Population as of April 1, 2000.
Competitor states are the 10 most populous states plus Connecticut, New Jersey and Massachusetts.
(1) 50-State Rank outside New York does not include "New York State (excluding local New York City employees)."
NA = Not Available.
NAP = Not Applicable.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Census of Governments: Employment Phase. 
(2) Based on average March 2002 full-time monthly payroll for local government employees. 
Table 10
Number of State and Local Full-Time Equivalent Employees Per 10,000 Residents
New York and Selected Competitor States
Fiscal Year 2001-2002
 
 
Among school districts, by far the most significant driver of expenditure growth is teacher 
compensation.  From school year 1995 to 2005, district expenditures increased 72 percent or 
$18 billion, including New York City.15  During this period, salaries per teacher increased 
only 29 percent from $63,233 to $81,822;16 however, health insurance, pensions, social 
security and other benefits for teachers grew 97 percent.  
 
The connection between the high labor costs among localities and state-level policy is the 
New York State Taylor Law, which sets the legal framework for collective bargaining 
between local governments and their workers.  For close to 40 years, the Taylor Law has 
protected the rights of public employees to bargain collectively with their employers, while 
simultaneously guarding the public against work stoppages and strikes.  The Taylor Law 
prohibits state and local government employees from striking,17 yet also provides employees 
with formal rights of organization and requires state and local governments to negotiate with 
recognized public employee organizations in good faith. 
 
The Taylor Law created the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) to administer the 
law and to assist in collective bargaining negotiations.  PERB’s general functions are to 
                                                 
15 New York State Department of Education, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research 
Unit, School District Fiscal Profiles, Masterfiles for 1994-1995 and 2004-2005. 
16 CBC calculation using data from the National Center for Educational Statistics.  
17 If public employees strike, they are fined twice their daily wages per day for going on strike but cannot lose 
their jobs.   
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determine and resolve disputes concerning representation status for employee organizations; 
to determine procedures for prevention of improper practices; to serve as a clearinghouse of 
labor information; to assist in collective bargaining; and to provide services for impasse 
resolution during the course of collective bargaining.  Local government can also create 
“mini-PERBS;” for example, New York City created the Office of Collective Bargaining 
(OCB). 
 
A case may be brought before PERB, if PERB determines an impasse exists.  PERB will 
then provide mediation for the impasse; if that fails, then parties proceed to one of two 
steps: (1) interest arbitration, in the case of police, fire, district attorneys and the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) unions, or (2) fact-finding, in all other cases.  In fact-
finding, the board chooses a panel of three people to make a non-binding recommendation 
based on evidentiary hearings.  In arbitration proceedings, a panel makes a binding 
determination to settle the case.  The Taylor Law provides only a loosely structured 
timetable for either negotiation process, resulting in settlements that take many months to 
reach.  In spite of this, there is a set two-year, statutory limit on settlement awards, regardless 
of how long expired a contract may be. 
 
Of 2,327 state and local contracts negotiated in New York in 2006-2007, 333 cases, or 14 
percent, were brought before PERB.18  Typically, approximately three-quarters of impasses 
resolved by PERB are done so through mediation.  Over the past four fiscal years, 12 
percent of cases have been settled through fact-finding or negotiations resulting from fact-
finding.  Seventeen cases, or 5 percent, were handled through arbitration in fiscal year 2007; 
this represents a rise in the number of cases since fiscal year 2003, in which there were eight 
cases and fiscal year 2004, in which there were 12.  Since arbitration is only available to select 
groups, the number of cases that can be resolved through arbitration is inherently limited.  
However, these select unions have a significant impact on local budgets.  In New York City, 
police, firefighters and district attorneys represent 24 percent of all local government 
employees.19 
 
An arbitration panel determines the settlement award by considering a number of factors: 
wages, hours, and conditions of similar-skilled or similarly-functioning employees (and with 
other employees generally) in public and private employment in comparable communities; 
the interests and welfare of the public; the financial ability of the public employer to pay; 
unique professional characteristics; and past collective bargaining agreements.20   
 
These criteria have been criticized for three reasons.  First, arbitration procedures do not 
sufficiently emphasize the ability of the employer to pay.  For many localities, a PERB 
settlement reverberates through the budget beyond wage increases for one union – which 
may alone suffice to place fiscal stress upon local government – through bargaining patterns 
and parity provisions.  In many cases, wage and salary increases for one police or fire union 
result in comparable settlements for other unions.  Second, comparison to similar 
communities may mean that “leapfrogging” occurs between unions in adjacent jurisdictions, 
                                                 
18 NYS Public Employment Relations Board, “PERB News,” volume 40, number 2,  May 2007. 
19 Actual full-time employee data for May 2007. New York City Office of Management and Budget, Financial 
Plan for New York City, Fiscal Years 2007-2011, Full-Time and Full-Time Equivalent Staffing Levels, July 2007. 
20 New York State Civil Service Law, Article 14, Section 209.  
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pushing salaries up rapidly.  A notable example is the wage increases for police unions in 
Nassau and Suffolk.  Third, the rules have resulted in forum-shopping by some unions, who 
eschew direct negotiations with management in favor of returning to PERB to settle their 
contracts.  In New York City, for example, five out of the past six police contracts have been 
settled by PERB in binding arbitration.  Other critics have argued that local governments 
themselves prefer this modus operandi, since it can allow governments to avoid direct 
responsibility for large settlements while appeasing unions.21 
 
In 1982, the state amended the Taylor Law to include the “Triborough Amendment,” which 
stipulates that the terms of an expired contract must continue until a new agreement is 
reached.  The Triborough Amendment is a key reason that the Taylor Law has been 
effective in minimizing the number and duration of strikes, since a preservation of the status 
quo eases workers’ fears of unilaterally imposed management conditions.22  As a result, until 
the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) strike in December 2005, no union in New York 
City had organized a large-scale strike in the past quarter century.23 
 
However, the Triborough Amendment is also criticized as working to favor unions over 
management in collective bargaining.  Managers cannot impose innovative practices without 
union approval, while workers benefit from longevity (and similar “step” increases for 
teachers) during impasse proceedings.  Teachers and other workers are often willing to work 
under expired contracts for long periods because these pay increases are available under the 
expired contract.  As of the beginning of the 2007-08 school year, 54 school districts in New 
York were at an impasse with their teacher unions.24  Of these impasses, 36 involve contracts 
that expired prior to the beginning of the 2006-07 school year, and five districts were 
entering a fourth year without a contract.25  Since 1990, the average number of school 
districts starting the year at impasse is 70.   
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Terry O’Neil and E.J. McMahon (Empire Center for New York State Policy), Taylor Made: the Cost and 
Consequences of New York’s Public-Sector Labor Laws, October 2007. 
22 McFadden, Robert.  “Giuliani Says Some in Union Were Misled About Law on Penalties for Strikes.”  The 
New York Times.  13 December 1999, pg. B5. 
23 United Federation of Teachers.  “UFT – The History of the Taylor Law.”  Accessed 13 July 2005, updated 9 
June 2005, available at http://www.uft.org/news/teacher/labor/taylor_law/print.html.  
24 Paul Heiser (New York State School Board Association), “Relative Calm on Teacher Contract Front,” On 
Board Online, Vol 8, No 16, September 17, 2007.  
25 School districts entering a fourth year without a new labor agreement are Buffalo, Canton, Norwood-
Norfolk, Potsdam and Herkimer-Fulton-Hamilton-Otsego BOCES.  
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WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO ADDRESS THE LOCAL TAX BURDEN? 
 
State officials have not ignored their constituents’ high and inequitable local tax burden.  In 
recent years they enacted two significant measures intended to lower local taxes: the School 
Tax Relief (STAR) program and an assumption by the State of part of localities’ 
responsibility for funding Medicaid.  In addition, in the 2007 legislative session, they initiated 
a foundation-based school funding approach to increase and better target state aid to more 
needy districts.  Some efforts have also been made to lower local government costs by 
consolidating some units of government and sharing services. 
 
 
School Tax Relief (STAR) 
 
In 1998, at Governor George Pataki’s initiative, the State began the School Tax Relief 
(STAR) program, which offers a partial school property tax exemption to owner-occupied 
homes through increased state aid.  The initial program was subsequently expanded and is 
funded at $3.7 billion in the current fiscal year.  In fiscal year 2006-07, New York created a 
property tax rebate program linked to the initial STAR design but reaching taxpayers with 
direct rebates rather than through aid to school districts.  In fiscal year 2007-08, the rebate 
program was redesigned to be partially based on household income.  This new program – 
called the Middle-Class STAR Rebate Program – is currently funded at slightly more than $1 
billion annually.  
 
Original STAR Program 
 
The original STAR program provides an exemption to homeowners against their school 
property tax liability.  Commercial and rental property and vacation homes are not eligible 
for the exemption.  The property value exemption is $56,800 for low-income senior citizens 
(enhanced STAR) and $30,000 for other homeowners (basic STAR).26 In ten wealthier 
counties – Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Saratoga, Suffolk, Ulster, 
Westchester and New York City – the exemption is increased by the degree to which the 
county’s median home sales price exceeds the state median home sales price.  Table 11 
displays the home sales price differential used to calculate the STAR exemption in 2007.  For 
example, an eligible homeowner in Dutchess would receive a market value exemption of 
$45,600 ($30,000 times 1.5201) rather than $30,000.  The exemption is not decreased for less 
property-wealthy counties. 
 
The STAR program operates as a form of state education aid.  The State reimburses local 
school districts for lost tax revenue due to STAR exemptions.  Thus, residents have lower 
property tax bills and school districts do not lose funding.  The State finances STAR 
reimbursements through its personal income tax.  
                                                 
26 Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Yonkers and New York City have fiscally-dependent school districts and levy 
property taxes for both municipal and school purposes.  To account for the inclusion of school taxes within 
city taxes, the STAR homestead exemptions for these cities are adjusted by multiplying the exemption amount 
that would have otherwise been determined for Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse and Yonkers by 67 percent and 
for New York City by 50 percent.  The homestead exemption is also adjusted by an equalization rate for all 
school districts.  The equalization rate is essentially the state’s measure of a municipality’s level of assessment, 
or the ratio of total assessed value over total market value.  
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Basic STAR Enhanced STAR
County Differential (Non-Senior) (Low-Income Senior Citizen)
Dutchess 1.5201 $45,600 $86,340
Nassau 2.2565 $67,690 $128,170
Orange 1.3961 $41,880 $79,300
Putnam 1.9213 $57,640 $109,130
Rockland 2.3036 $69,110 $130,840
Saratoga 1.0617 $31,850 $60,300
Suffolk 1.9237 $57,710 $109,270
Ulster 1.1006 $33,020 $62,510
Westchester 2.9748 $89,240 $168,970
New York City 
1
2.0954 $31,430 $59,510
Note: Exemption is rounded to the nearest multiple of 10 dollars.
Source: New York State Office of Real Property Services. CBC staff calculations.
Home Value Exemption
Table 11
2007 STAR Median Home Sales Price Differentials
(1) Exemptions for New York City are reduced 50 percent to account for inclusion of school 
property taxes within city property taxes.
 
 
In New York City, where many residents are renters, all residents – homeowners and renters 
– receive a 5.9 percent personal income tax rate reduction and a flat refundable income tax 
credit.  The 5.9 percent rate cut translates to a 0.23 base point reduction for the top income 
bracket in the City, from 3.88 percent to 3.65 percent.  The rate reduction saves the median 
homeowner in the City about $132 in personal income tax liability.27  The flat refundable 
personal income tax credit is $290 for joint tax filers and $145 for single filers in state fiscal 
year 2008.  Homeowners in New York City also receive the STAR homestead exemption 
from city property taxes.  The STAR homestead exemption savings for a non-senior 
homeowner in the City was $219 in city fiscal year 2007.  Thus, the median-income, non-
senior homeowner in the City would receive $641 in total local tax relief from STAR ($641 = 
$132 + $290 + $219).  
 
New York City receives an income tax reduction from STAR because property taxes on 
homeowners in the City are relatively low – due to the City’s diverse tax base – and the City 
has a high share of renters.  No other locality in New York State receives personal income 
tax reductions from the STAR program.  Consequently, renters in other New York 
municipalities do not enjoy any benefit from STAR.   
 
                                                 
27 According to U.S. Census data, the median household income for homeowners in New York City in 2006 
was $74,500.  Calculation uses 2007 personal income tax brackets and rates and assumes household files jointly 
and claims the standard deduction and one exemption for a child.   
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Property tax relief from STAR’s homestead exemption varies significantly within the state 
and even within counties.  In three of New York’s “Big 5” cities – Buffalo, Rochester and 
Syracuse – STAR savings for non-seniors fall below $500.  The savings in Yonkers is much 
higher due to the high median home sales price in Westchester County.  Figure 4 illustrates 
the range of property tax relief from STAR’s exemption program, from $632 in Massena, St. 
Lawrence County to $2,087 in Mount Vernon, Westchester County for non-senior 
homeowners.  
 
Note: New York City STAR savings does not include savings from the personal income tax reduction.
Source: New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.
Figure 4
Basic (Non-Senior) and Enhanced (Low-Income Senior) STAR Savings 
By Select School Districts
State Fiscal Year 2006-2007
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STAR as State Aid 
 
STAR reimbursements to school districts are a form of state aid.  However, New York 
distributes STAR aid on a different basis from most other forms of school aid.  The State 
allocates conventional school aid through formulas that favor districts with more pupils, 
more pupils with special needs, and lower than average property tax bases.  In contrast, the 
State distributes STAR based on the value of homes in the county (homeowners in wealthier 
counties get more) and the property tax rate in the district (the exemption is worth more 
where the tax rate is higher).28   
 
The net result of the unusual STAR distribution factors is that payments strongly favor 
wealthier districts.  On average, STAR increased state aid to school districts $713 per pupil 
or 20 percent.  However, Scarsdale received $930 per pupil in STAR aid.  This payment 
increased Scarsdale’s total state aid per pupil 84 percent, from $1,102 per pupil to $2,032 per 
pupil.  In contrast, the STAR program increased total state aid per pupil in Utica 13 percent, 
                                                 
28 A classic homestead exemption reduces property values subject to taxation by a set amount, thus providing 
lower-valued homes with a greater percent reduction in property taxes.  Due to New York’s diverse housing 
market, STAR includes exemption inflators (differentials) for counties with high property values.  These 
inflators drive more tax relief to higher-income homeowners and distort the policy goal of the program. 
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from $6,211 to $7,044 per pupil.  In Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse, STAR increased state 
aid only 4 percent.  In fact, the three wealthiest counties in New York State received 42 
percent of STAR aid in 2005.29   
 
If New York utilized the same funding formula for STAR as for other education aid, STAR 
would be allocated to school districts very differently.  As shown in Figure 5, if STAR were 
distributed as state school aid, New York City would receive $715 per pupil instead of $517 
per pupil.  Buffalo would receive $1,436 per pupil instead of $348, while Scarsdale would 
receive $332 per pupil rather than $930 per pupil.  
 
Source: New York State Department of Education, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit, School District Fiscal Profiles, Masterfile for 2004-
2005.
Figure 5
STAR Per Pupil
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Moreover, STAR does not provide property tax relief to businesses, even though the 
property tax is the single largest tax on businesses in New York State.30  Outside of New 
York City, residential property accounted for 71 percent of the school property tax levy in 
2005; the remaining 29 percent was primarily commercial and other uses such as agriculture 
and industrial.31  If New York distributed STAR aid to all types of owners in proportion to 
their share of the levy, then nonresidential property owners outside of New York City would 
have received $581 million in property tax relief in 2005 and their property tax burden would 
have fallen 12 percent.  
 
STAR as Local Tax Reduction Policy 
 
A major goal of the STAR program is to reduce the local tax burden in New York State.  
However, the mechanism of reimbursing school districts for exemptions has proved to be an 
ineffective tool for lowering tax burdens.   
                                                 
29 Douglas Lee Adams. “The Dark Side of New York State’s STAR Exemption Program.”  
30 Total State and Local Business Taxes: 50 State Estimates for Fiscal Year 2006 (Joint Project of Ernst and 
Young, LLP and the Council on State Taxation), February 2007.  Posted on the New York State Business 
Council Website. 
31 New York State Office of Real Property Services. CBC staff calculations. 
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First, STAR is a tax shift, not a tax cut.  Through the STAR program, a portion of the local 
tax burden is shifted to the State.  Without STAR, New York would have $4.7 billion more 
available for expenditures, such as state education aid or tax reductions.  Thus, New York 
State funds STAR either through lower levels of public service, cost reductions or higher 
state taxes.  While shifting the tax burden to the state level promotes equity, the shift does 
not reduce total tax collections in the State. 
 
Second, research suggests that STAR actually motivates districts to increase their tax 
collections.  The STAR program motivates local school districts to spend more in two ways: 
lowering the cost of services to the district and reducing monitoring and effectiveness of 
spending.  In effect, STAR reimbursements lower the local “tax price” of education.  
Economists argue that tax prices have a significant impact on demand for local public 
services,32 and that lowering the cost of public services increases demand for public services.  
Consequently, STAR increases public demand for education spending.  One study finds that 
replacing 10 percent of school taxes with STAR funds increases school spending 1.6 
percent.33   
 
STAR also impacts school spending by diminishing voter pressure on cost containment.   
Residents directly observe the impact of increased school spending on their property tax bill.  
In districts with high local taxes, voters put more pressure on school officials to lower costs 
and operate schools more efficiently.34  Efficiency measures for schools determine how 
much is spent to achieve stated student achievement goals, such as pass rates on 
standardized exams.  An increase in school spending that does not increase student 
achievement is inefficient.   
 
One study based on the full implementation of STAR finds that a 1 percent increase in 
STAR funds reduces education spending efficiency 12 percent.35  Another study estimates 
that STAR results in a 6.14 percent efficiency loss for the average school district in New 
York.36  The researchers hypothesize that STAR leads voters to call for spending on 
                                                 
32 Daniel Rubenfeld, Local Public Economics: A Methodological Review. Handbook of Public Economics, 
Vol. 2, A.J. Aurbach and M. Feldstein, eds, 1987, 87-161; Helen Ladd and John Yinger, America’s Ailing Cities: 
Fiscal Health and the Design of Urban Policy, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991; 
William Duncombe, Public Expenditure Research: What Have We Learned? Public Budgeting and Finance, 1996, 
Vol. 16, No. 2, 26-58; Ronald Fisher and Leslie Papke, Local Government Response to Education Grants, 
National Tax Journal 53, March 2000, 153-168. 
33 Jonah Rockoff, Community Heterogeneity and Local Response to Fiscal Incentives, Working paper, Harvard 
University.  
34 William Duncombe and John Yinger. Alternative Paths to Property Tax Relief. Property Taxation and Local 
Government Finance, ed. W.E. Oates, Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2001, 243-294.; William 
Duncombe and John Yinger. An Analysis of Two Educational Policies in New York State. Educational 
Finance to Support Higher Learning Standards, ed. J.H. Wyckoff, Albany: New York State Board of Regents, 
1998, 98-137. 
35 Tae Ho Eom and Ross Rubenstein. Do State-Funded Property Tax Exemptions Increase Local Government 
Inefficiency? An Analysis of New York State’s STAR Program. Public Budgeting and Finance, Spring 2006, Vol 26, 
No 1. The study develops an efficiency index that captures spending significantly related to measurable 
outcomes, such as test scores and drop-out rates. 
36 Tae Ho Eom, William Duncombe and John Yinger, Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New 
York’s STAR Program, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse 
University, October 2005.  
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objectives outside of the ones captured in the student achievement measures.  Thus, school 
districts spend more on programs not directly linked to the state’s standard measures of 
student achievement.     
 
The latter study also finds that STAR raised student performance 4.45 percent on average 
due to heightened public demand for educational services.  Combined with the above 
mentioned efficiency loss, the average school district increased spending per pupil 8.14 
percent.  Consequently, the average district increased the property tax rate 21.33 percent.  
Important to note, this property tax increase applies to all property, including commercial 
property that does not benefit from STAR.  Overall, increases in property tax rates offset 
one-third of the savings from STAR exemptions (see Table 12).  
 
The study also finds that the impacts of STAR are largest in upstate rural districts, upstate 
small cities and the upstate “Big 3” cities, where property values tend to be low.  While these 
districts witnessed large increases in student performance, they also experienced large 
declines in efficiency and increased tax rates.  In upstate rural districts, the unintended 
consequences of STAR offset intended taxpayer savings 50.7 percent.   
 
Since the aforementioned studies analyzed STAR as the program was being phased in, it is 
possible that STAR’s negative impact on school spending was strongest in its initial years.  
The State has taken steps to alert taxpayers to how much benefit they should receive from 
STAR, in order to promote transparency and prevent school districts from offsetting these 
benefits with spending increases.  Since taxpayers should now receive more constant annual 
property tax reductions from STAR, they may be more likely to notice on their property tax 
bills if district spending increases significantly offset their STAR payments.  
   
Estimated Percentage Impact of STAR on…
Region
Student Performance 
Index 
1
School District 
Efficiency
School Spending 
Per Pupil
School Property 
Tax Rate
Offset of STAR 
Savings
New York City 2.34 (3.25) 4.13 6.97 24.82
Yonkers 3.73 (4.99) 6.49 15.08 30.80
Downstate Small Cities 3.24 (4.51) 5.85 9.60 16.09
Downstate Suburbs 2.45 (3.56) 4.51 6.09 22.19
Upstate Big 3 6.04 (7.58) 10.25 28.36 30.78
Upstate Small Ciities 5.44 (7.36) 9.86 21.87 27.93
Upstate Suburbs 4.27 (5.96) 7.81 15.33 27.02
Upstate Rural 6.06 (8.19) 11.10 41.15 50.70
Average District 4.45 (6.14) 8.14 21.33 32.96
.
(1) Includes pass rate of fourth and eighth grade standard exams for English and math and the non-dropout rate (percent of students who have not 
dropped out by their scheduled graduation date). 
Source: Tae Ho Eom, William Duncombe and John Yinger, Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York’s STAR Program, Center for Policy Research, 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, October 2005. 
Table 12
The Findings of Ho Eom, Duncombe and Yinger 2005 Study 
Unintended Consequences of STAR
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Property Tax Rebates 
 
In fiscal year 2006-2007 New York implemented a property tax rebate program to increase 
property tax relief to homeowners.  In fiscal year 2007-2008, this program is being replaced 
by a “Middle-Class Rebate Program,” which directs property tax rebates to lower-income 
homeowners. (The homestead exemption from the original STAR program remains the 
same; the rebates are added relief.)    
 
 
2006-2007 Property Tax Rebate Program 
 
In State fiscal year 2006-07, the State initiated a property tax rebate program to augment the 
original STAR program.  Homeowners received a check in the mail from the State 
Department of Tax and Finance for the appropriate amount.  Unlike STAR, the money was 
not paid to school districts but to individuals.  However, the amount of the rebate was linked 
to certain STAR rules – the rebate was greater for low-income seniors than all others, and 
the rebate was indexed by the STAR home value differentials to give greater rebates in the 
wealthier counties.  The rebate increased total STAR relief for non-seniors 30 percent and 
increased relief for low-income senior citizens 27 percent. 37  
 
 
2007-2008 Middle-Class Rebate Program 
 
In 2007, the State replaced the initial rebate program with a “Middle-Class Rebate 
Program.”38 The new rebate program provides checks only to homeowners earning less than 
$250,000, in varying amounts based on a sliding scale (see Table 13).  The rebate amount is 
based upon the homeowner’s STAR savings from the property value exemption in fiscal year 
2006-07.  For example, homeowners earning less than $90,000 in Buffalo will receive rebates 
worth 60 percent of their STAR homestead exemption savings in the prior year.  For low-
income seniors, the rebate equals 25 percent of their STAR homestead exemption savings in 
fiscal year 2006-2007.  
                                                 
37 The basic property tax rebate for non-seniors equaled $9,000 multiplied by the full school property tax rate in 
2004-2005 multiplied by the county home sales price differential multiplied by the adjustment for the “Big 5” 
cities.  The enhanced property tax rebate for low-income senior citizens equaled 1.67 multiplied by the basic 
property tax rebate.   
38 The Governor’s original “Middle-Class STAR” proposal did not include rebates.  Instead, the increased tax 
relief would have been allocated through STAR exemptions. 
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Type of Homeowner
$0 - $90,000 $90,000 - $150,000 $150,000 - $250,000 $250,000 +
Non-senior Upstate 60% 45% 30% 0%
$0 - $120,000 $120,000 - $175,000 $175,000 - $250,000 $250,000 +
Non-Senior Downstate 60% 45% 30% 0%
Below $67,850
Senior Citizen 25%
Income Level
Source: New York State Division of the Budget.
Table 13
Structure of Middle-Class STAR Rebate
Fiscal Year 2007-2008
(Percent of 2006-2007 Original STAR Homestead Exemption Savings)
 
 
 
The amount of the new rebate varies significantly by county and by school district, since it is 
based on a homeowner’s property tax relief from the original STAR exemption program.  A 
non-senior homeowner in New York City will receive a rebate worth $132 while 
homeowners in Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse will receive rebates in the $250 to $300 
range.  Homeowners in more property-wealthy counties will receive greater rebates.  An 
owner in Mount Vernon, Westchester County will receive a $1,252 rebate while an owner in 
Saratoga Springs will get a check for $327.  Figure 6 illustrates the variation in rebate 
amounts for selected school districts.    
  
 
Source: New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.
Figure 6
2007-08 Middle-Class Property Tax Rebate Program
(Household Income Below $90,000 Upstate and $120,000 Downstate)
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Change in Property Tax Rebates from 2006-07 to 2007-08 
 
The impact of this year’s changes in the rebate program can be assessed by comparing the 
amounts received by different types of taxpayers (see Table 14).  Assuming that school tax 
rates and the median county home sales price differential factors remain constant, property 
tax rebates for non-senior homeowners in the lowest income bracket – household income 
below $90,000 upstate and below $120,000 downstate – will double from fiscal year 2006-07 
to 2007-08.  Homeowners in the second lowest income bracket will receive 50 percent more, 
while rebates for the second highest income group will remain the same.  The wealthiest 
homeowners – household income above $250,000 – will no longer receive rebates.  The 
property tax rebate for all low-income seniors will decrease 6 percent statewide.    
 
Property Tax Rebate 
Only (percent change)
Total STAR Savings - 
Exemption Plus Rebate 
(percent change)
Income Bracket
Downstate
$0-$90K 100% 23%
$90K-$150K 50% 12%
$150K-$250K 0% 0%
$250K +  (100%)  (23%)
Upstate
$0-$120K 100% 23%
$120K-$175K 50% 12%
$175K-$250K 0% 0%
$250K +  (100%)  (23%)
Senior Citizen
Below $67,850  (6%)  (1%)
Table 14
Change in STAR Property Tax Relief by Income and Location
Assumption: School Tax Rates and Median Home Values Remained Constant
Source: Office of the New York State Comptroller; New York State Division of the Budget; CBC Staff Calcluations.
State fiscal year 2006-07 to 2007-08
Note: Change will be higher in school districts with increasing school property tax rates and in property-
wealthy counties whose median home sales prices grow faster than the State median.
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Table 14 also shows the change in tax relief from the STAR exemption program and the 
rebate program combined.  A non-senior homeowner earning less than $250,000 will have 
his or her total property tax relief increase zero to 23 percent, depending on household 
income.  Households earning more than $250,000 will have their total property tax relief 
decrease 23 percent.  Because the initial rebate program was generous to low-income senior 
citizens, total property tax relief for low-income seniors will actually decrease 1 percent.  
This decrease will slightly narrow the differential benefit between low-income senior citizen 
and all other homeowners.  However, it is important to note that the year-to-year change in 
property tax relief will be greater in districts in which school tax rates have been rising and 
lower in districts in which the school tax rates have been decreasing.  Similarly, STAR 
property tax relief will be greater in property-wealthy counties whose median home sales 
prices are increasing more rapidly than the state median home sales price.  As discussed 
previously, property values in downstate New York – excluding New York City – increased 
five times faster than in upstate over the last decade.  
 
 
Growth in STAR Expenditures 
 
As shown in Figure 7, from fiscal year 1998-99 to 2007-08, school property tax relief 
spending increased from $600 million to $4.7 billion.  The initial exemption program was 
fully implemented at a cost of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2001-02 and then was enriched to 
cost $3.7 billion in the current year.  The newer rebate program cost $670 million in its first 
year and $1 billion in the current year. 
 
* Projected as of April 2007.
Sources: New York State Office of the Comptroller, Cash Reports, Fiscal Years 1999 to 2007; New York State Division of the Budget, Enacted 
Budget Report, Fiscal Year 2008.
Figure 7
Growth of School Tax Relief (STAR) Program
With and Without Property Tax Rebates
State Fiscal Years 1999 to 2011
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Medicaid Local Growth Cap and Cost Containment  
 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that pays for medical care for low-income families 
and individuals.  In New York, the federal government pays for half the cost of the program. 
The State divides the non-federal share of the program costs between the State government 
and local governments, specifically the counties and the City of New York.  Localities pay 25 
percent of acute care expenditures and 10 percent of long-term care costs.  As a result, New 
York City finances about 17 percent of Medicaid expenditures for its residents, and all other 
counties pay an average of 18 percent.39  This relatively large share of local funding is 
unusual; 30 states do not mandate any local Medicaid funding, and the 19 others require a 
much smaller share of local financing.   
 
Due to multiple state level policy decisions (including expanded eligibility and high provider 
payment rates), Medicaid has become an increasing burden on New York’s counties.  From 
1993 to 2003, county Medicaid expenditures more than doubled, from $1.1 billion to $2.3 
billion.  In some counties, Medicaid expenditures experienced average annual growth rates in 
the double digits.  In 1993 Medicaid expenses comprised 13.5 percent of counties’ general 
fund spending and 40.2 percent of their property tax levy; in 2003 Medicaid represented 19.1 
percent of general fund spending and 73.2 percent of the property tax.40   
 
State officials have responded to the fiscal pressures on localities in two ways: 1) state 
assumption of the local share of the cost of the Family Health Plus Program (FHP); and 2) a 
state-funded cap on the growth in localities share of Medicaid spending. 
 
The FHP is a component of the larger Medicaid program that covers adults who do not 
qualify for other Medicaid coverage due to their incomes and family status.  In 2004, state 
legislation authorized a phased-in assumption by the State of the localities share of this 
program.  Beginning January 1, 2005, the State paid for 50 percent of previously local FHP 
costs, and effective January 1, 2006 the State assumed the entire non-federal share of the 
program.  The program had about 658,000 enrollees in fiscal year 2007.  In local fiscal years 
ending in 2008, the FHP state takeover will save New York City $363 million and all other 
counties $130 million.  
 
In 2005 the State authorized a cap on the growth in localities share of total Medicaid 
spending.  Beginning January 1, 2006, the cap limited annual local spending growth to 3.5 
percent in 2006, 3.25 percent in 2007, and 3 percent in 2008 and beyond.  The State will 
finance all expenditure growth above the cap.  In 2008, county governments will choose to 
either continue to pay a local share of Medicaid with an annual growth cap of 3 percent or 
allow the State to receive a portion of their local sales tax revenue in return for entirely 
financing Medicaid expenditures.  The Medicaid cap will save New York City $343 million 
and all other counties $297 million in local fiscal years ending in 2008.  Table 15 shows the 
total local savings from the Family Health Plus takeover and Medicaid cap. 
 
                                                 
39 Based on fiscal year 2006.  Calculation uses data from the New York State Department of Health, Medicaid 
Quarterly Expenditure Reports; New York City Office of the Comptroller, 2006 Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report; and New York State Office of the Comptroller. 
40 Office of the New York State Comptroller, Local Government Finance Division.  
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Family Health Plus $60.0 $289.0 $452.8 $492.8 $522.5 $536.3
Medicaid Cap $113.0 $412.3 $640.3 $1,068.0 $1,610.5
Total $60.0 $402.0 $865.1 $1,133.1 $1,590.5 $2,146.8
Note: Includes New York City.
Actual data for 2005 and 2006.  All other years projected. 
Source: New York State Division of the Budget. 
Local Fiscal Year Ending in…
Table 15
Local Savings from State Takeover of County Healthcare Costs
(dollars in millions)
 
 
Although the FHP takeover and the Medicaid cap enable counties to lower their tax 
collections, passing the costs to the State necessitates increased state taxes.  Thus, the 
combined state and local tax burden is transferred from one source to another but not 
lowered.  The new financing arrangement is more equitable, but other measures are required 
to lower the combined state and local tax burden.  
 
 
Foundation Aid for Schools 
 
In 2007, at Governor Spitzer’s initiative, the Legislature enacted a foundation approach to 
allocate school aid based on need and ability to pay.  The improvements included: 
movement away from the “shares” method that divvied up aid based more on politics than 
rationality; the consolidation of many arcane categorical aid categories; and the creation of a 
special education component that allows greater flexibility of services.  The new approach is 
part of the Governor’s Four-Year Education Investment Plan, which will increase total 
school aid by $7.6 billion when fully phased-in in 2010-11; in the current school year, the 
school aid increment is $1.8 billion.  
 
Unfortunately, last-minute political compromises weakened the initially proposed reform in 
two ways.  First, the original proposal derived state aid based on the amount districts could 
raise on their own by applying the state median tax effort to their taxable resources.  State 
aid would then enable districts to reach a predetermined level of per pupil spending.41  A 
compromise ultimately allowed an alternative method for calculating the state aid.  The 
alternative calculation – which includes four possible variations – relies on an approach used 
in prior years called the “local sharing aid ratio.”  Districts may select the method most 
favorable to them to calculate the amount of aid they are eligible to receive.  Most districts 
found that the alternative calculation lowered the amount of local revenue that the State 
presumed the districts would raise on their own.  The “local sharing aid ratio” approach 
                                                 
41 School districts would not have been required to impose the median tax effort.  Districts could opt to impose 
higher or local tax efforts. The State defines tax effort as the ratio of local school taxes to district property 
values. 
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dilutes the intended tax equalizing effects of the foundation approach and allocates aid to 
less needy districts. 
 
Second, a compromise increased the aid amounts for the wealthiest districts in the State.  In 
the Executive Budget, the Governor proposed a “hold harmless” provision for 304 districts 
that would otherwise not qualify for state aid increases under the foundation formula.   
These districts would have received a minimum aid increase of 3 percent, costing the State a 
combined total of $149 million.  Due to the creation of additional formulas for determining 
state aid, during enactment of the budget state leaders increased aid for these 304 wealthy 
districts to $329 million.42  
 
Base grants and enhancements for the wealthiest districts work against equity, exacerbating a 
pattern of inequitable per pupil spending.  The new foundation approach makes significant 
progress in raising spending among poorer districts but leaves much unachieved in 
promoting greater equity and better targeted use of state aid. 
 
 
Government Consolidation Initiatives 
 
The costs related to the fragmented structure of local governments have been addressed in 
two state efforts and an initiative in Nassau County. 
 
In 2006 New York created the Shared Municipal Service Incentive program (SMSI) to 
encourage cooperative cost-saving ventures between municipalities.  The State initially 
funded the program, which provides grants to localities that implement shared services 
programs, at $2.75 million.  Examples of shared services include fire, water, utilities, roads 
and highways (for example snow removal), garbage and refuse, sewage, parks, playgrounds, 
recreation centers, libraries, ambulance and hospital, public health, and mental health.  In 
fiscal year 2007 the State expanded SMSI to include special purpose units of government and 
to target particular municipal services and expenditures.  The program’s current funding is 
$25 million, $10 million of which is specifically dedicated to the consolidation of local 
government units.  According to the New York State Comptroller, at least 3,332 cooperative 
agreements between local governments exist in New York.43 
 
Governor Spitzer established the Commission on Local Government Efficiency and 
Competitiveness in April 2007 to identify potential partnerships between the State and local 
governments to improve efficiency and effectiveness.  The Commission will examine the 
potential for consolidation and other shared services agreements and will report its 
recommendations by April 15, 2008.  The Commission held four public hearings throughout 
the State in 2007 and has already issued a list of 150 model projects to receive assistance 
from state agencies.  These projects include village-town consolidations, school district 
                                                 
42 Calculation based on data from State of New York, State Education Department, 2007-08 Enacted Budget State 
Aid, July 2007.   
43 Office of the State Comptroller, Division of Local Government Services and Economic Development, 
“Intermunicipal Cooperation and Consolidation: Exploring Opportunities for Savings and Improved Service 
Delivery,” September 3, 2004. 
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consolidations, and fire district consolidations, as well shared services agreements, such as 
employee health insurance and policing.44 
 
Nassau County is currently pursing several consolidation initiatives.  In September 2007 
Nassau County Executive Tom Suozzi announced a plan for four municipalities in the 
county to consolidate their sewage treatment operations with the County’s Sewer and Storm 
Water Authority.45  The agreements guarantee that no jobs will be lost.  In addition, the 
county is funding a study to create a blueprint for consolidation in the county by identifying 
and estimating potential areas for cost savings.46  The initiative is a public-private partnership 
between the county and the Hagedorn Foundation, at a cost of $500,000 to the county. 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness, 
http://www.nyslocalgov.org/news.asp accessed on October 3, 2007. 
45 Nassau County, News Releases, September 25, 2007, 
http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/agencies/countyexecutive/NewsRelease/2007/9-25-2007-2.html accessed 
on October 3, 2007. The municipalities are Cedarhurst Village, Lawrence Village, Glen Cove, and Long Beach. 
46 Nassau County, News Releases, March 13, 2007, 
http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/agencies/CountyExecutive/NewsRelease/2007/03-13-2007.html accessed 
on October 12, 2007. 
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LOCAL TAX RELIEF OPTIONS 
 
This section identifies and assesses options for New York to amend and expand upon its 
current tax relief programs. The options to be considered fall into three categories: measures 
to cap the local tax burden, measures to make the local tax burden more equitable, and 
measures to reduce the cost drivers of the local tax burden.  The first category includes 
various forms of a property tax cap; the second category includes circuit breakers and 
improving on STAR, implementing a full state takeover of Medicaid, and equalizing local 
school tax efforts; the last category includes local government consolidation, containing 
Medicaid costs, and reforming pension benefit and labor negotiations.          
 
 
New York State’s Current Local Tax Relief Programs 
 
As previously discussed, New York’s STAR program offers partial homestead exemptions 
from school property taxes, as well as property tax rebates.  The State also assumed a 
portion of locally-financed Medicaid expenditures, increased state education aid and 
improved methods to better target aid to needy districts, and offered incentives for shared 
local services and local government consolidation. 
 
In addition to these efforts, New York offers a smaller – and less well-known – “circuit 
breaker” program.  Circuit breaker programs are tax refunds given to households based on 
property taxes as a share of income.  New York’s program is available to households with 
less than $18,000 in income and less than $85,000 in property value.  In State fiscal year 
2004-05, the program provided an average credit of $106 to 279,000 residents at a cost of 
$30 million.47  Of these recipients, 91 percent were renters and 65 percent were under 65 
years old.  At the program’s peak in 1990, the circuit breaker paid $51 million to 544,000 
residents.  Eligibility criteria have not changed since 1985.  (The merits of the circuit breaker 
program and options to expand it will be discussed later in this section.) 
 
New York’s State Constitution also limits the amount of property taxes to be raised by local 
governments for all purposes excluding debt service and repayments.48  Counties cannot levy 
more than 1.5 percent of the average full valuation of taxable real estate in the county; cities 
(excluding New York City) and villages cannot collect more than 2 percent of full value 
within their jurisdiction.  The constitution permits New York City to levy 2.5 percent of its 
full property value.  Counties may receive permission to raise their limit to 2 percent.  As of 
2006, five counties had exhausted more than 89 percent of their constitutional tax limit.49  
Because the constitutional limit only applies to property taxes, the law does not prevent 
municipalities from increasing other tax sources, such as the sales tax.  As discussed 
previously, growth in county sales taxes outpaced growth in county property taxes in the 
past decade.  
 
                                                 
47 New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Office of Tax Policy Analysis, Real Property Circuit 
Breaker Tax Credit: 2005 Credit Use by County, July 2007. 
48 New York State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 10a – 10e.  
49 New York State Office of the Comptroller, 2007 Financial Report on Counties.  The five counties are: 
Allegany, Chenango, Cortland, Fulton and Montgomery.  
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Lastly, New York allows state personal income tax filers who itemize deductions to deduct 
property taxes paid in the State from their adjusted gross income.  In 2004, 1.6 million filers 
claimed this deduction.50 
 
 
Limiting Tax Collections – “Tax Caps” 
 
As shown in Table 16, more than a dozen states cap the annual growth of property tax 
collections.  Probably the best known of these measures are California’s Proposition 13, 
enacted in 1978, and Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 ½ enacted in 1980.  California’s measure 
limits assessed value growth to 2 percent and the full value tax rate to 1 percent; 
Massachusetts limits property tax growth to 2.5 percent and the local property tax levy 
cannot exceed 2.5 percent of aggregate property values.  In both California and 
Massachusetts, capital expenditures and voter-approved initiatives are exempted from the 
limit.  In addition, new property development is not subject to the cap.  
 
Some other states’ caps are structured as a fixed percentage; others equal the lesser of a fixed 
percentage or inflation.  In states that cap assessed value growth, a limit on property tax rates 
is also necessary to contain levy growth.  Annual property tax growth limits range from 4 
percent in Kentucky to one percent in Washington.  Colorado limits state government 
spending to inflation plus the rate of population growth and refunds all excess tax revenue to 
taxpayers.  Most states with an assessed value cap include an "acquisition value" rule which 
resets the assessed value of property to market value at time of sale.51  Consequently, the 
actual property tax burden can vary significantly among similar homes, depending on the 
year of purchase.   
 
With soaring home values in recent years, more states have explored a property tax cap.  
South Carolina’s legislature recently approved a tax-assessment cap that would partially 
replace property taxes with sales taxes, but it is awaiting a ballot referendum. Georgia 
lawmakers have been pushing for a 3 percent cap.52  New Jersey’s fiscal year 2008 budget 
includes a measure to limit property tax growth to 4 percent annually, as well as distribute 
means-tested property tax rebates.  Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell pushed for a 3 percent 
annual property tax cap for the State’s 2008 budget, to be supplemented by an increase in 
the State’s income tax rates.  The cap was defeated by the Legislature.   
 
Benefits of Caps 
 
A property tax cap seeks to keep property tax increases at a reasonable pace.  When the real 
estate market is strong, homeowners may witness a rapid increase in home values but no 
commensurate increase in incomes.  A cap offers a degree of predictability and allows 
homeowners to more accurately plan their finances.  In addition, by allowing residents to 
vote on any spending initiatives above the cap, residents have more power to evaluate how 
                                                 
50 New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Office of Tax Policy Analysis, Analysis of 2004 Personal 
Income Tax Returns: Profile of Income, Deductions, Credits and Tax, June 2007. 
51 Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Capping Assessed Valuation Growth: A Primer, 2005.  
52 Patrik Jonsson, Several States Eye Moves to Cap Tax Growth After Property Boom, The Christian Science 
Monitor, March 8, 2006.  
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much spending is affordable and practical.  Furthermore, under a cap, local governments – 
typically school districts – are forced to control spending and focus on programs and 
initiatives targeted to meet specified goals.  Consequently, increased fiscal pressure on local 
governments may result in efficiency gains.  Lastly, property tax caps provide broad relief to 
all taxpayers.53  Commercial and industrial property owners – in addition to single family 
homeowners – benefit from caps.  Lowering the property tax burden on business may 
promote economic development, and over time, some of the tax savings for businesses may 
be passed on to tenants, employees and consumers.  
 
State
Fixed 
Percentage Inflation
Lesser of Fixed Percentage or 
Inflation
Arizona 2%
California
(1)
Colorado 
(2)
Inflation plus population growth
Idaho 3%
Illinois Lesser of 5 percent or inflation
Kentucky 4%
Massachusetts 2.5% 
(3)
Michigan Lesser of 5 percent or inflation
Missouri Lesser of 5 percent or inflation
Montana
One-half average inflation rate for 
prior 3 years
New Mexico Lesser of 5 percent or inflation
South Dakota Lesser of 3 percent or inflation
Washington 
(4)
Lesser of 1 percent or inflation
West Virginia 3%
(3) Municipalities cannot levy more than 2.5 percent of total full value of taxable real and personal property.
(4) Only applies to non-school taxing districts.
Source: Karen Lyons and Iris J. Lav.  The Problems with Property Tax Revenue Caps, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 2007.
Table 16
Property Tax Caps in Other States
Cap Equals…
(1) Assessed property values cannot grow more than 2 percent or the inflation rate, whichever is less.  Property tax rates also cannot 
exceed 1 percent of assessed value.
(2) Applies to all taxes.
 
 
California and Massachusetts illustrate lowered tax burdens under caps. In 1977, 
Massachusetts ranked number three for the highest combined state and local tax burden per 
$1,000 of personal income, directly behind New York in the number two spot.54  At the 
time, the Massachusetts tax burden was 22 percent higher than the national average.  By 
1992 Massachusetts ranked number 23 with a state and local tax burden one percent below 
                                                 
53 This benefit is not true for caps that do not apply to all property.  For example, New York City caps assessed 
value growth for only one-, two- and three-family homes.  The design of this cap in effect shifts the property 
tax burden to other classes of property. 
54 Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, State and Local Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Personal 
Income, June 2007.  Data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government 
Finances.  
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the national average.  As of 2005, Massachusetts had the 33rd highest state and local tax 
burden in the nation.  From 1985 to 2006, Massachusetts property tax levy increased 219 
percent despite an increase of 520 percent in assessed property values.55  In 1977, California 
had the fifth highest state and local tax burden, 15 percent above the national average.56  By 
1992, the state fell to number 19 with a tax burden just one percent above the average.  In 
2005, California’s tax burden ranked number 17 in the nation.  
 
Disadvantages of Caps 
 
Property tax caps have their critics.  Based on a combination of logic and empirical study of 
the experience with caps, they make three important points: 
 
1. Caps are undemocratic and artificially limit residents’ demand for public services.  Revenue limits 
may prevent residents from being able to fund service improvements they desire.  
Perhaps more importantly, the limits may prevent communities from even sustaining 
existing levels of service, because the cost factors for some services are not 
controlled locally and may increase at rates above the cap.  Recently, the costs of 
healthcare, pensions, and fuel have grown faster than inflation.  Local governments 
have limited control over such cost increases.  Similarly, caps do not account for 
federal and state mandates, such as requirements under the federal No Child Left 
Behind Act. Unfunded mandates pose an additional, and uncontrollable, cost for 
local governments. 
 
This phenomenon is evident in the provision of educational services in California 
since Proposition 13.  Adjusting for inflation, in 1978 spending per pupil in 
California was $600 above the national average but fell to $600 below average in 
2000. 57  As of fiscal year 2005, California raised 9 percent less revenue per pupil than 
the national average and ranked number 30 in the nation for revenue per pupil 
compared to number 22 in 1990.58  As of 2005, California had the second-highest 
ratio of students per teacher in any state, 20.9 students per teacher.  Using an average 
state composite score for 4th graders and 8th graders from 1990 through 2003 for 
reading and math exams, California scored number 48th in the nation, above only 
Louisiana and Mississippi.59 
 
2. Caps affect lower income communities more adversely than wealthier ones.   Assessed property 
value caps (as in California) are most valuable in areas where home values are 
appreciating rapidly, but they provide little or no relief in areas where home values 
are stagnant or declining.  Moreover, property tax caps on the aggregate levy (as in 
Massachusetts) may exacerbate education and other public service provision 
                                                 
55 Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services, Municipal Databank/Local Aid Section. 
56 Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, State and Local Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Personal 
Income, June 2007.  Data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government 
Finances.  
57 Karen Lyons and Iris J. Lav, The Problems With Property Tax Revenue Caps, Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, June 2007. 
58 National Center of Education Statistics. 
59 Karen Lyons and Iris J. Lav, The Problems With Property Tax Revenue Caps, Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, June 2007. 
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inequities between wealthy and poor areas.  If the limit allows for voter-approved 
overrides, wealthy communities are more likely to pass spending initiatives that 
exceed the cap.60  Communities with stronger commercial or hospitality sectors and a 
more diverse tax base will also be less constrained by limits to the property tax.  
Consequently, spending caps disproportionately constrain the ability of lower-
income communities to improve or expand public services. 
 
Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 ½ was characterized by such inequities.  From 1981 to 
1984, the poorest 20 percent of communities in the State were forced to cut their 
property tax levy 9 percent annually; in contrast, the richest fifth had to reduce their 
collections only 3 percent annually.  From 1983 to 2004, the poorest fifth passed 133 
overrides worth a total of $32 million, while the richest fifth passed 388 overrides 
worth $162 million.61 
 
3.  Caps may be circumvented, putting other problematic burdens on taxpayers.  Communities 
constrained by a property tax cap may increase other revenue sources, such as the 
sales tax and fees and fines.  These other financing sources tend to be regressive and 
are not deductible from federal or state income taxes.  In addition, shifting reliance 
on the sales tax may promote the “fiscalization of land use” and increase dependence 
on new property developments.62  Communities may be more likely to seek large 
commercial developments and less likely to develop more affordable housing.  
Competition with other communities for large businesses may also promote the use 
of discretionary tax reduction incentive packages and lead to a “race to the bottom.”    
 
California provides an example of the shift to alternative forms of revenue – 
developer fees.  A study of one county in the State found that developer fees 
accounted for discrepancies in home sale prices between $7,000 and $8,000 per 
residential unit in low- and high-fee cities.63  Similarly, a study in Massachusetts 
concludes that the police in towns and cities fiscally constrained by Proposition 2 ½ 
are 28 percent more likely to issue a speeding ticket than a warning, reflecting the 
pressure on the police to raise alternative forms of revenue.64 
 
Another critical point relates to the cyclical impacts of tax caps.  During a declining housing 
market, a lowered level of allowable property tax collections is set, creating a “ratchet 
effect.”65  The lower level is then the new basis for allowable growth.  Thus, an economic 
downturn will continue to constrain communities long after the economy recovers.  
                                                 
60 Karen Lyons and Iris J. Lav, The Problems With Property Tax Revenue Caps, Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, June 2007. 
61 Municipal Finance Task Force, Local Communities at Risk: Revisiting the Fiscal Partnership Between the Commonwealth 
and Cities and Towns, September 2005.  
62 Jeffrey I. Chapman, Proposition 13: Some Unintended Consequences, Public Policy Institute of California, 
September 1998.  
63 Karen Lyons and Iris J. Lav, The Problems With Property Tax Revenue Caps, Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, June 2007. 
64 Michael Makowsky and Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic 
Citations, January 2007.  Referenced in September 2, 2007 New York Times article by Judith Chevalier, 
“Welcome, Stranger. Here’s a Speeding Ticket.” 
65 David H. Bradley, Nicholas Johnson, and Iris J. Lav, The Flawed “Population Plus Inflation” Formula: Why 
TABOR’s Growth Formula Doesn’t Work, Center on Budget Policy and Priorities, January 2005. 
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Some of the above concerns may be offset with sufficient increases in state aid.  Targeted 
state aid to general governments and school districts constrained by a cap may prevent 
harmful service reductions or the imposition of alternative revenue sources.   
 
School Property Tax Caps in New York State 
 
Due to the recent increase in education aid, the most constructive way to envision a property 
tax cap in New York is at the school district level.  School districts represent 58 percent of 
the property tax levy outside of New York City, and the objects and pace of their 
expenditure growth have been questioned by some.  Furthermore, state officials had 
considered a cap on school district spending when STAR was enacted.  As previously 
discussed, in the absence of a cap, STAR contributes to growth in school district 
expenditures.  In fact, at the time STAR was enacted, the State imposed a spending cap equal 
to 4 percent or 120 percent of inflation for school districts that fail to pass a school budget.  
Because the vast majority of school budgets pass, few districts have been subject to this 
cap.66   
 
The tables below and in Appendix I present the result of a simulation of three different 
types of caps for school districts in New York (excluding New York City).  The data show 
the consequences of a cap on individual school districts if a cap had been implemented in 
fiscal year 1998, the year prior to the implementation of the STAR program.  Each option 
assumes that STAR did not occur.  The first option assumes that New York capped the full 
value school property tax rate by school district at their fiscal year 1998 levels.  The second 
assumes that the State capped the growth rate of the property tax levy per total weighted 
pupil units (TWPU) at 3 percent annually.67  The third option assumes that the State capped 
the growth rate of the property tax levy per pupil (not weighted) at 3 percent annually.  Due 
to data limitations, none of the models could be adjusted for new property developments.  
See Appendix I for detailed data by county.  
 
Under the first option, in fiscal year 2005, 465 out of 676 school districts would be fiscally 
constrained by the cap (see Table 17).  As a result, the total school property tax levy would 
be $1.2 billion less in the State, and constrained schools would spend an average of $1,087 
less per pupil.  Districts outside of Long Island and the Hudson Valley, where property 
values have risen the slowest, would be most constrained by this type of cap.   
 
                                                 
66 For the 2007-08 school year, 11 districts – including Albany – did not pass a school budget and were thus 
subject to a cap. New York State Education Department, Statewide Annual School District Budget Voting Results, as 
of June 2007. 
67
 The measure, TWPU, is a weighted count based on the adjusted average daily attendance of elementary and 
secondary school students plus weightings for certain characteristics of the student population, such as percent 
special education, low-income, or low-English language proficiency.  Half-day kindergarten pupils are weighted 
at 0.5. 
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Region
School Property 
Tax Burden                   
(per $1,000 Income)
Number of 
School 
Districts
Number of 
Constrained 
Districts
Necessary 
Tax 
Reductions
Pupils in 
Constrained 
Districts
Tax 
Reduction 
Per Pupil
Capitol District 55 74 69 213,722,489 149,013 1,434
Central New York 51 39 39 148,546,825 120,328 1,235
Finger Lakes 52 70 69 242,020,405 191,804 1,262
Hudson Valley 44 101 40 138,543,079 139,699 992
Long Island 48 121 8 45,390,927 25,248 1,798
Mohawk Valley 51 54 50 84,209,129 83,508 1,008
North Country 56 63 50 40,550,799 62,851 645
Southern Tier 51 74 71 110,629,268 116,954 946
Western New York 44 80 69 153,373,205 193,577 792
Total $48 676 465 $1,176,986,124 1,082,982 $1,087
Table 17
By Region
Sources: New York State Department of Education, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit, School District Fiscal Profiles, Masterfile for 1997-
1998 and 2004-2005. New York State Office of the Comptroller, Local Government Division, Finances for Local Governments. CBC Staff Calculations.
Impact in 2005 of Property Tax Cap Model 1
Levy Capped at 1998 Full Value Rate
 
 
Under option two, in fiscal year 2005, 389 school districts would be fiscally constrained by 
the cap (see Table 18).  The total school property tax levy would be $599 million less, and 
constrained schools would spend an average of $856 less per pupil.  Once again, districts 
outside of Long Island and the Hudson Valley would be most constrained by this type of 
cap.  On the whole, the TWPU measure increased 28 percent from fiscal year 1998 to 2005 
in the State.  However, during this time, the TWPU increased 56 percent in Nassau County; 
67 percent in Suffolk County; and 65 percent in Westchester County. 
 
Region
School Property Tax 
Burden                   
(per $1,000 Income)
Number of 
School 
Districts
Number of 
Constrained 
Districts
Necessary 
Tax 
Reductions
Pupils in 
Constrained 
Districts
Tax 
Reduction 
Per Pupil
Capitol District 55 74 50 77,827,090 92,410 842
Central New York 51 39 34 62,428,687 101,526 615
Finger Lakes 52 70 62 135,142,954 134,770 1,003
Hudson Valley 44 101 20 52,686,139 51,053 1,032
Long Island 48 121 6 40,338,140 13,062 3,088
Mohawk Valley 51 54 48 52,993,944 66,925 792
North Country 56 63 50 40,950,578 59,955 683
Southern Tier 51 74 62 62,482,631 98,316 636
Western New York 44 80 57 73,829,543 81,451 906
Total $48 676 389 $598,679,706 699,468 $856
Impact in 2005 of Property Tax Cap Model 2
Table 18
Sources: New York State Department of Education, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit, School District Fiscal Profiles, Masterfile for 
1997-1998 and 2004-2005. New York State Office of the Comptroller, Local Government Division, Finances for Local Governments. CBC Staff Calculations.
If Levy per Total Wealth Pupil Unit (TWPU) 
Capped at 3 Percent
By Region
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Interestingly, if New York implemented a 3 percent annual growth cap on the school 
property tax levy per pupil (not per TWPU), the results are very different.  If such a cap were 
implemented in 1998, as of 2005 634 school districts would be fiscally constrained and 
schools would have to reduce spending $2.5 billion from current levels (see Table 19).  The 
reduction would translate to $1,591 less per pupil.  This type of cap would significantly 
impact school districts all across the State.  Designing a cap based on pupils rather than 
TWPU impacts more school districts because the TWPU measure has increased faster than 
the number of pupils.  This occurrence is a result of more pupils being classified in weighted 
categories, such as special education.  As mentioned above, the TWPU measure has 
increased most rapidly in downstate counties.  
 
Region
School Property Tax 
Burden                   
(per $1,000 Income)
Number of 
School 
Districts
Number of 
Constrained 
Districts
Necessary 
Tax 
Reductions
Pupils in 
Constrained 
Districts
Tax 
Reduction 
Per Pupil
Capitol District 55 74 71 195,244,965 153,354 1,273
Central New York 51 39 37 108,212,215 114,888 942
Finger Lakes 52 70 69 229,488,057 156,960 1,462
Hudson Valley 44 101 98 691,044,815 327,489 2,110
Long Island 48 121 114 881,840,780 435,313 2,026
Mohawk Valley 51 54 50 66,647,066 71,475 932
North Country 56 63 55 66,915,365 58,733 1,139
Southern Tier 51 74 70 116,885,551 110,596 1,057
Western New York 44 80 70 132,494,361 134,991 982
Total $48 676 634 $2,488,773,174 1,563,800 $1,591
Impact in 2005 of Property Tax Cap Model 3
Table 19
Sources: New York State Department of Education, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit, School District Fiscal Profiles, Masterfile for 1997-
1998 and 2004-2005. New York State Office of the Comptroller, Local Government Division, Finances for Local Governments. CBC Staff Calculations.
By Region
If Levy per Pupil Capped at 3 Percent
 
 
Important to note, the imposition of a school property tax cap would need to adequately 
address the three disadvantages of a cap listed above.  The design and provisions of the cap 
would have to ensure that the cap does not artificially constrain necessary spending, create 
inequities between poor and wealthy districts, or lead to increases in other taxes or fees.  The 
three simulations above of a school property tax cap in New York highlight the importance 
of a cap’s design on the ultimate outcomes of the program.  
 
 
A More Equitable Tax Burden 
 
An alternative strategy to limiting growth in local taxes is to promote more equitable local 
tax burdens.  In this context, equity is defined by a more progressive tax structure, shifting 
the burden away from lower-income residents onto higher-income residents.  Three broad 
options would promote that goal – income tax circuit breakers, a state assumption of 
Medicaid costs, and equalizing local school tax burdens through more targeted distribution 
of state education aid.  
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Circuit Breakers 
 
A popular form of property tax relief is the circuit breaker.  A circuit breaker “shuts off” an 
individual’s or household’s property tax liability when it exceeds a predetermined share of 
income.  The excess property tax liability is refunded to the taxpayer through a credit on the 
state income tax or the local property tax.  As shown in Table 20, currently, 18 states – 
including New York – offer some form of circuit breaker program.68  These programs vary 
in terms of magnitude and eligibility criteria.  In eight of the states with a program, only 
senior citizens and disabled residents are eligible.  Most states offer the credit to both 
homeowners and renters.  The circuit breaker credits for renters assume a "property tax rent 
equivalent" which equals a percent of annual rental payments and varies from 6 to 25 
percent by state.  Oklahoma is the only state with a circuit breaker that does not extend the 
credit to renters; Oregon offers the credit to renters but not to homeowners.   
 
Circuit breaker programs also vary in terms of income eligibility and magnitude of the credit.  
Income ceilings range from $10,000 for an individual in Oregon to $200,000 in New Jersey.  
Only six of the states that offer circuit breakers have income ceilings above $45,000; New 
York has an income ceiling of $18,000.  Maximum benefits range from $200 in Oklahoma to 
$2,000 in Maine.  In New York, senior citizens can be paid up to $375 while residents under 
65 years old receive a credit up to only $75. 
 
States also differ in how they administer the programs.  Nine states offer their circuit breaker 
through a separate tax rebate; the other nine administer the program through the personal 
income tax.  In general, using a separate rebate leads to lower participation rates, yet using 
the personal income tax weakens the connection between the credit and property tax relief.  
Rebates may also add to a household’s taxable income and be offset be a slight increase in 
personal income tax liability, yet personal income tax credits often provide relief to taxpayers 
many months after the payment of property taxes. 
 
As a consequence of the varying criteria, states expend a varying share of resources on their 
circuit breaker programs.  For instance, in Oklahoma, Oregon and New York, lost revenue 
from the circuit breaker credits equals less than 0.1 percent of all property tax collections.  
However, Michigan, Minnesota, and Vermont allocate over 6 percent of property tax 
collections to their circuit breaker programs. 
 
                                                 
68 Karen Lyons, Sarah Farkas and Nicholas Johnson (Center of Budget and Policy Priorities), The Property Tax 
Circuit Breaker: An Introduction and Survey of Current Programs, March 2007. 
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State
Senior Citizens 
or Disabled 
Only
Homeowners 
Only
Homeowners 
and Renters
Income Ceiling 
(single filer)
Maximum 
Benefit
District of Columbia X $20,000 $750 
Illinois X X $21,218 $700 
Maine X $77,000 $2,000 
Maryland X 
(1) (2)
Michigan X X $45,000 $840 
Minnesota X
$87,780 
(homeowner); 
$47,350 (renter)
$1,640 
(homeowner); 
$1,350 (renter) 
Missouri X X $25,000 $750 
Montana X X $45,000 $1,000 
New Jersey
(3)
X
$200,000 
(homeowner); 
$100,000 (renter)
$1,200 
(homeowner); 
$825 (renter)
New Mexico X X $16,000 $250 
New York X $18,000 
$375 ($75 if 
under age 65)
Oklahoma X X $12,000 $200 
Oregon X
(4)
$10,000 $2,100 
Pennsylvania X X $15,000 $500 
Rhode Island X $30,000 $250 
South Dakota X $30,000 $250 
Vermont 
(5)
X $47,000 None
Wisconsin X $24,500 $1,160 
(1) Renters under age 60 must have at least one dependent under 18 living with them.
(3) Available to renters over 65.
(4) Renters only.
(5) Vermont has a separate school property tax circuit breaker available to homeowners with income less than $110,000.
Eligibility and Benefits
Source: Karen Lyons, Sarah Farkas, and Nicholas Johnson. The Property Tax Circuit Breaker: An Introduction and Survey of Current Programs, 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 2007. 
Table 20
Property Tax Circuit Breakers in New York and Other States 
(2) Income ceiling equals net worth excluding home. Ceiling is $60,000 for homeowners; $38,659 for renters under 60; and 
$30,000 for renters over 60.
 
 
 
Benefits 
 
The underlying logic behind levying property taxes is property wealth contributes to an 
individual’s overall ability to pay taxes.  However, although property wealth is an important 
dimension of one’s economic standing, home values often increase at different rates than 
personal income.  During a strong housing market, home values may increase much more 
rapidly than one’s salary and wages.  Thus, property taxes may consume a growing share of 
income.  Similarly, senior citizens or others on fixed incomes may have growing property tax 
bills and zero income growth.  Although a home may be sold and converted into cash, the 
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expense and inconvenience of relocating may make this option unfeasible or undesirable for 
lower-income households.  Thus, circuit breakers provide assistance to taxpayers whose 
property taxes are burdensome relative to current income. 
 
Circuit breakers target property tax relief to lower-income individuals, who tend to spend a 
greater share of income on housing.  Median monthly housing costs for homeowners and 
renters with incomes below the federal poverty line amount to 45 percent of income; the 
national median for all homeowners and renters is 22 percent.69  Nationally, property taxes 
represent about 14 percent of housing costs for the median homeowner.70  However, in New 
York, property taxes contribute closer to 22 percent of median owner housing costs.  In 
New York the poorest 20 percent of households lose 4 percent of income to property taxes, 
while the richest 1 percent pays only 0.7 percent of their income to property taxes.71  
 
Disadvantages 
 
Circuit breaker programs are limited to residential households; no existing circuit breaker 
offers relief to commercial property.  Since local governments may need to increase taxes on 
all other property to offset the lost revenue, circuit breakers may increase the burden for 
non-residential property. 
 
Similarly, state-funded local property tax relief programs are a tax shift, not a tax reduction.  
To fund the relief program, states need to raise taxes or reduce services.  Absent caps on the 
program’s benefits, the shift may even have the effect of encouraging localities to raise taxes 
and pass some of the burden onto the state.   
 
Expanding New York’s Existing Circuit Breaker 
 
Because the income and wealth criteria for New York’s circuit breaker program have not 
been modified since 1985, the program continues to shrink and to provide relief to fewer 
residents.  In 2006, the median household income in New York was $51,384, far above the 
circuit breaker’s income ceiling of $18,000.72  Similarly, the median home value and median 
rent in the State were $303,400 and $875, respectively, also well-above the program’s value 
and rent ceilings of $85,000 and $450, respectively.   
 
In the latest legislative session, representatives sponsored 10 separate bills to expand the 
circuit breaker program.  Recommended changes included: increasing the income ceiling to 
$80,000; increasing the monthly rent ceiling to $1,000; increasing the maximum credit to 
$800; increasing the home value ceiling to $150,000; increasing the home value ceiling to the 
median county home value; offering enhanced credits to disabled taxpayers; and including 
municipal fees in the calculation of property taxes.73   
                                                 
69 2005 American Household Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics 
Division.  
70 2006 American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau.  
71 Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, New York Taxes Hit Poor and Middle Class Far Harder than 
the Wealthy, January 2003.  
72 2006 American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau.  
73 Refers to New York State bills: A100, A443, A522, A1406, A1593, A2239, A2730, A5214, A5541, A6624, 
S297, S338, S3088, S3820, S4605, S4774, and S4917. 
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All of the above amendments would expand the number of residents receiving assistance 
and the amount of relief given to each recipient.  Simply adjusting for inflation, the new 
income ceiling would be $38,000; the new home value ceiling would be $179,000; and the 
new rent ceiling would be $949.  A provision to automatically adjust these criteria for 
inflation would further ensure that the circuit breaker program remains effective.  
 
Converting STAR into a Circuit Breaker 
 
As described earlier in the section on STAR rebates, beginning in State fiscal year 2008 New 
York will distribute property tax rebates to households earning less than $250,000 annually.  
The rebate amount will vary based on location in the State and household income (refer to 
Table 13).  The rebate calculation is confusing and steers more relief downstate, where home 
values and property taxes are higher yet local school tax efforts are lower.   
 
An easy – and transparent – way to improve upon the STAR rebate program is to base a 
household’s rebate on property taxes as a share of income.  The rebate program could retain 
or lower the income ceiling of $250,000 and add a ceiling for home value.  To target most 
relief to poorer residents, the threshold to receive the rebate – property taxes as a share of 
income – could be lower for lower income brackets.  A bill sponsored by New York 
Assembly Member Teresa Sayward presents an example of how STAR could be structured 
as a circuit breaker (the proposal is entitled “Twenty-First Century STAR”): 
 
Household Income 
Percent of Household Income 
Above Which Property Taxes Will 
Be Refunded 
Less than $50,000 3 
$50,000 to $100,000 5 
$100,000 to $150,000 6 
$150,000 to $200,000 7 
More than $200,000 No credit available 
             
To limit costs of the program (and to prevent local governments from excessively increasing 
the local property tax), the new STAR rebate should also be capped.  In addition, deeper 
credits can be created for low-income senior citizens.  If the STAR rebate is limited to the 
most heavily burdened taxpayers, with more relief going to lower-income households, the 
saved money can be used to include renters and commercial property owners.  Renters can 
easily be included by calculating a property tax equivalent amount – perhaps in the range of 
20 percent of annual rent.  A rebate for commercial property owners might take the form of 
a flat credit for owners falling below a specified net income and property value ceiling.  
 
Over time, a STAR circuit breaker could replace the STAR homestead exemption program, 
which (as described above) is fraught with problems.  In fiscal year 2008-09 spending for the 
STAR homestead exemption program and the property tax rebate program is expected to 
reach $5.4 billion.  This money could fund a much expanded circuit breaker program.  As 
shown in Table 21, a circuit breaker that refunded property taxes above 5 percent of New 
York Adjusted Gross Income (NYAGI) for homeowners earning less than $20,000 and 
above 7 percent of NYAGI for all others would cost $2.6 billion.  A circuit breaker program 
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for renters that refunded property taxes in excess of 6 percent of NYAGI would cost $2.7 
billion.74 The combined cost of the program for owners and renters is about equal to the 
projected annual cost of the STAR program. (See Appendix II for methodology and detailed 
data.)  
 
Due to data limitations, the circuit breaker option in Table 21 does not cap individual credits 
nor place a ceiling on rent or home value.  Including such criteria would significantly lower 
the cost of the program and further target relief to the most heavily burdened taxpayers.  
 
Number Average Number Average Number
Income Class Receiving Credit Credit Cost Receiving Credit Credit Cost Receiving Credit Cost
Under $5,000 218,487                3,640     795 951,937                1,278      1217 1,170,424             2,012 
$5,000 - 9,999 155,305                1,117     174 668,063                948        633 823,368                807    
10,000 - 19,999 446,578                1,774     792 817,545                754        617 1,264,123             1,409 
20,000 - 29,999 488,377                984       481 501,847                459        230 990,224                711    
30,000 - 39,999 470,910                657       309 -                       -         -    470,910                309    
40,000 - 49,999 405,725                240       97 -                       -         -    405,725                97      
50,000 - 59,999 -                       -        -    -                       -         -    -                       -     
60,000 - 74,999 -                       -        -    -                       -         -    -                       -     
75,000 - 99,999 -                       -        -    -                       -         -    -                       -     
100,000 - 199,999 -                       -        -    -                       -         -    -                       -     
200,000  and over -                       -        -    -                       -         -    -                       -     
Total 2,185,381             $635 $2,648 2,939,392             $693 $2,697 5,124,773             $5,345
Table 21
Impact of Expanded Circuit Breaker Program
(dollars in millions)
Sources: New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Analysis of 2004 Personal Income Tax Returns; U.S. Bureau of the Census; CBC Staff Calculations.
Note: Credit equals property taxes exceeding 5 percent of New York Adjusted Gross Income for owners with less than $20,000; 7 percent of New York Adjusted 
Gross Income for owners above $20,000; and 6 percent of New York Adjusted Gross Income for renters.  See Appendix II for methodology.
Owners Renters Total
 
 
 
State Medicaid Takeover 
 
New York State’s unusual practice of requiring counties to pay a significant share of 
Medicaid costs is widely criticized. Economists and policymakers generally agree that 
redistributive payments, such as Medicaid, should be funded at the broadest level possible.  
Under the current system, counties with disproportionate shares of low-income residents 
bear a greater fiscal burden and are thus forced to maintain a higher rate of taxation than 
wealthier counties.  Local financing for Medicaid also reduces accountability; the State 
controls the policy, but localities administer some of the services and bear the fiscal 
consequences of decisions by the state officials.  
 
A complete state takeover of local Medicaid expenses would ameliorate these problems.  By 
shifting financing of Medicaid to the State, wealthier individuals would shoulder a higher 
share of Medicaid costs because State revenues, notably the personal income tax, are more 
progressive than local property and sales taxes.   
                                                 
74 It is assumed that 20 percent of annual rent equals total property taxes paid.  Consequently, refunding 
property taxes over 6 percent of income is equivalent to refunding annual rent exceeding 30 percent of income 
(if rent/income = 0.3, then 0.2 * rent = 0.06 * income). 
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2005 Local Medicaid Added State Net Impact on Added State Net Impact on 
Expenditure PIT Liability Tax Burden Per Capita PIT Liability Tax Burden Per Capita
County of Residence ($000s) ($000s) ($000s) Impact ($000s) ($000s) Impact
New York City $4,906,000 $2,918,158 (1,987,842) (242)
Albany 63,685                             50,654            (13,030) (44) 96,854            33,170 111
Allegany 8,120                               2,921              (5,199) (103) 5,585              (2,535) (50)
Broome 36,211                             18,991            (17,220) (88) 36,311            101 1
Cattaraugus 17,039                             5,833              (11,206) (137) 11,153            (5,886) (72)
Cayuga 13,746                             6,823              (6,923) (85) 13,046            (700) (9)
Chautauqua 33,027                             9,302              (23,725) (175) 17,785            (15,241) (113)
Chemung 25,866                             8,402              (17,465) (197) 16,065            (9,802) (111)
Chenango 10,167                             3,764              (6,403) (124) 7,197              (2,970) (57)
Clinton 17,330                             7,445              (9,885) (120) 14,235            (3,095) (38)
Columbia 11,564                             8,900              (2,664) (42) 17,017            5,453 87
Cortland 9,414                               4,066              (5,348) (110) 7,775              (1,639) (34)
Delaware 8,995                               3,884              (5,112) (109) 7,426              (1,570) (33)
Dutchess 46,655                             51,477            4,821 16 98,426            51,771 175
Erie 186,850                           122,357          (64,492) (70) 233,954          47,104 51
Essex 9,539                               3,696              (5,843) (151) 7,068              (2,472) (64)
Franklin 10,348                             3,101              (7,247) (142) 5,930              (4,418) (87)
Fulton 16,127                             4,522              (11,605) (209) 8,646              (7,481) (135)
Genesee 10,154                             5,433              (4,721) (80) 10,389            235 4
Greene 9,702                               4,831              (4,871) (98) 9,238              (465) (9)
Hamilton 594                                 470                 (124) (24) 898                 304 59
Herkimer 13,331                             4,471              (8,860) (140) 8,549              (4,782) (76)
Jefferson 19,129                             7,195              (11,934) (104) 13,757            (5,371) (47)
Lewis 5,178                               1,594              (3,584) (134) 3,048              (2,130) (80)
Livingston 8,740                               6,200              (2,540) (40) 11,856            3,115 49
Madison 10,934                             7,079              (3,855) (55) 13,535            2,601 37
Monroe 174,993                           107,684          (67,309) (92) 205,897          30,904 42
Montgomery 12,566                             3,941              (8,625) (176) 7,536              (5,030) (102)
Nassau 280,201                           452,307          172,106 130 864,835          584,634 441
Niagara 42,125                             21,567            (20,558) (95) 41,237            (888) (4)
Oneida 55,617                             21,300            (34,316) (147) 40,727            (14,889) (64)
Onondaga 87,931                             60,910            (27,021) (59) 116,464          28,533 62
Ontario 17,675                             13,892            (3,783) (36) 26,562            8,887 85
Orange 65,127                             51,867            (13,261) (35) 99,172            34,044 90
Orleans 8,051                               3,064              (4,986) (115) 5,859              (2,192) (51)
Oswego 23,090                             10,532            (12,558) (102) 20,137            (2,953) (24)
Otsego 11,860                             6,007              (5,853) (94) 11,486            (374) (6)
Putnam 11,872                             23,577            11,704 116 45,080            33,207 330
Rensselaer 27,581                             19,080            (8,501) (55) 36,483            8,902 57
Rockland 63,933                             61,249            (2,684) (9) 117,112          53,179 180
St. Lawrence 23,065                             7,444              (15,622) (140) 14,233            (8,832) (79)
Saratoga 24,388                             37,385            12,997 60 71,482            47,094 219
Schenectady 34,032                             20,945            (13,087) (87) 40,048            6,016 40
Schoharie 5,706                               2,824              (2,882) (90) 5,400              (306) (10)
Schuyler 3,699                               1,448              (2,250) (116) 2,769              (929) (48)
Seneca 6,518                               2,606              (3,911) (113) 4,984              (1,534) (44)
Steuben 18,442                             9,203              (9,239) (94) 17,596            (846) (9)
Suffolk 232,011                           340,161          108,151 74 650,406          418,396 285
Sullivan 23,068                             8,192              (14,876) (194) 15,663            (7,405) (97)
Tioga 7,614                               4,732              (2,882) (56) 9,048              1,434 28
Tompkins 12,345                             12,603            258 3 24,097            11,753 117
Ulster 36,173                             23,190            (12,983) (71) 44,340            8,167 45
Warren 11,795                             8,659              (3,135) (47) 16,557            4,762 72
Washington 10,951                             4,991              (5,960) (94) 9,543              (1,408) (22)
Wayne 13,837                             9,741              (4,095) (44) 18,626            4,789 52
Westchester 198,246                           446,715          248,469 262 854,143          655,897 691
Wyoming 5,239                               3,248              (1,991) (47) 6,211              972 23
Yates 3,967                               1,686              (2,281) (92) 3,225              (743) (30)
Total, Counties Outside of
    New York City $2,156,163 $2,156,163 $0 $0 $4,122,699 $1,966,536 $177
Total $7,062,163 $7,062,163 $0 $0
Sources: New York State Office of the Comptroller; New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Office of Tax Policy Analysis, 2004 New York Adjusted Gross Income and Tax Liability: Analysis of 
State Personal Income Tax Returns by Place of Residence, May 2007. CBC Staff Calculations.
State Takeover of County Medicaid, 
Excluding NYC
State Takeover of County Medicaid, 
Including NYC
Table 22
Impact of State Takeover of County Medicaid Expenditures
If Funded by Across-the-Board Personal Income Tax Increase
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A state Medicaid takeover should also consider the disproportionate share of Medicaid 
expenditures (about 65 percent) in New York City. 75  A state takeover that included the City 
would shift substantial costs from the City’s taxpayers to taxpayers in virtually every other 
jurisdiction in the State.  For example, as shown in Table 22, if an across-the-board increase 
in the state personal income tax financed the higher state expenditures, the per capita tax 
burden would rise in 27 counties, with the per capita tax burden in nine counties increasing 
more than $100.  
 
If a state Medicaid takeover excluded New York City, only seven counties would be net 
losers.  The most adversely impacted county would be Westchester, whose state and local tax 
burden would increase $262 per capita.  This calculation assumes that the State increases the 
personal income tax across-the-board for all counties outside the City.  Potentially, the State 
could levy a personal income tax surcharge on residents except those in the City.   
 
Variations of the state Medicaid takeover are being considered in the Legislature. In the 2007 
session, former Assembly Member Paul Tonko sponsored the “Medicaid Reform and Tax 
Equity Act of 2007.”76  The bill would have refunded county Medicaid expenses exceeding 
6.5 percent of all locally-generated county revenue in 2002.  New York City would have 
received a flat reimbursement of $1 billion.  To fund increased state expenditures, the bill 
proposed restoring the personal income tax structure in effect from 2003 to 2005, which 
added two high-income tax brackets and raised the highest marginal rate to 7.7 percent. 
Counties would have to use at least 80 percent of the refund to lower the local tax burden.  
Senator Vincent Leibell and Assembly Member Adam Bradley cosponsored a bill that would 
establish a zero percent annual growth rate in county Medicaid expenses.77    
 
 
Education Aid Based on Uniform School Tax Effort  
 
One way to promote equity in both the local tax burden and spending per pupil is to 
distribute state education aid using an equalization or uniform tax effort approach.  This is 
similar to the foundation aid strategy proposed by Governor Spitzer, but it puts even more 
emphasis on equal tax effort.  Under this approach, the State would apply a rate equal to the 
median local school tax effort to a school district’s wealth (an equally weighted average of 
property value and personal income).  Any district that cannot meet the median per pupil 
spending level with this tax effort would be eligible for state aid to make up the difference.  
Districts that can raise sufficient funds from their own local tax bases at the median tax 
effort would receive no state aid.  If higher spending is desired in districts that are spending 
above the median per pupil and taxing above the median tax effort, they can raise the tax 
rate above the state mandated minimum effort and spend the additional funds on their 
schools.  
 
Figure 8 summarizes the results of a simulation using the 2007-08 data for a uniform tax 
effort policy with the targeted average per pupil spending set at this year’s median for all 
                                                 
75 New York State Department of Health, 2006 Medicaid Quarterly Expenditure Reports.  
76 Bill number A5283.  
77 Bill number S2384 and A1419. 
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districts.  Under the new policy, total spending for public schools would increase from the 
current $46 billion to $48 billion.  The 428 districts currently spending below the state 
median per pupil would receive $2.8 billion more state aid, and the 249 districts currently 
spending above the median would receive $813 million less state aid.   
 
Low or Average High
324 Districts 104 Districts
Policy Impact: Policy Impact: 
$1,602 million state aid increase $1.2 billion state aid increase
$156 million local tax increase $489 million local tax decrease
249 Districts 0 Districts
Policy Impact: No Policy Impact
$813 million decrease in state aid
$47 million local tax increase
Figure 8
School District Spending per Pupil and Local Tax Effort
Impacts of Uniform Tax Effort Policy
School Year 2007-08
Below or At 
Adequacy 
(Median) Level
Above Adequacy 
(Median) Level
School Tax Effort
Source: New York State Education Department, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit (August 14, 
2007). CBC staff calculations.
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Note: School tax effort equals local school taxes divided by an equally weighted measure of personal income and 
property values.
 
 
 
Among the 428 districts that would be able to increase spending per pupil, fully 104 would 
also be able to lower their tax effort.  These districts could lower local taxes $489 million.  
Another 235 districts that are currently spending below the median would be required to 
increase local tax effort, and 89 districts would retain their current tax effort level.  
 
At the same time wealthier districts would have their state aid reduced.   Of the 249 districts 
that would receive less state aid, 103 districts would be required to have higher local tax 
efforts and 146 districts would retain their current tax levels.  Among these 249 districts, 
state aid would be reduced $813 million, including a $178 million cut from 66 districts that 
would no longer receive any state aid.   
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Reducing Local Cost Drivers 
 
The costs of local government could be reduced effectively by pursuing four options: (1) 
structural changes to the Medicaid program to reduce ineffective services; (2) reforms in the 
pension benefits for public employees; (3) changes to the legal framework for collective 
bargaining; and (4) small school district consolidations.   
 
 
Reduce Medicaid Expenditures 
 
The problem with New York’s Medicaid program is not just the unusually high share of local 
government funding; it also is excessively expensive.  New York State has the most 
expensive program nationwide, with an average cost per person enrolled 69 percent higher 
than the national average.  The State’s high program costs result largely from three sources: 
1) paying hospitals, nursing homes and other institutional providers above average rates; 2) 
allowing middle-class, elderly residents to qualify for long-term care; and 3) failing to utilize 
managed care and permitting greater use of personal care services than other states.78   
 
If New York reduced the rates paid to hospitals and nursing homes, tightened eligibility 
loopholes, reduced usage of home care, and utilized more managed care, the State would 
save $2 billion.79  Because the State and local governments jointly fund Medicaid, these 
savings would translate to a savings of $748 million for counties and New York City.80 
 
 
Pension Benefit Reforms 
 
Generous pension benefits were once justified for state and local employees to compensate 
for low wages, but salaries for public employees in New York no longer lag their private 
sector counterparts.  The Citizens Budget Commission 2006 report, Old Assumptions, New 
Realities: The Truth About Wages and Retirement Benefits for Public Employees, found that most state 
and local employees in New York earn higher wages than comparable workers in the private 
sector.  Thus, the current wage structure no longer requires above average pension benefits 
for government employees.  
 
The State Legislature determines pension benefits for both state and local government 
employees.  State law governs a uniform pension benefit system for public workers, which 
separates workers into a few different categories.  Pension benefits are not supposed to be a 
subject of collective bargaining.  Once granted, the State Constitution protects pension 
benefits for current workers and retirees from cutbacks; lower benefits can be mandated 
only for workers hired after the new benefits are enacted in law. 
 
                                                 
78 See Citizens Budget Commission, Medicaid in New York: Why New York’s Program is the Most Expensive in the 
Nation and What to Do About It, April 2006.  Available at www.cbcny.org.    
79 See Citizens Budget Commission, Options for Budgetary Savings in New York, October 2007. Available at 
www.cbcny.org.    
80 Local governments would accrue 25 percent of acute care savings and 10 percent of long-term care savings. 
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Union leaders and public officials have circumvented these intentions in two ways.  First, 
they in fact negotiate pension benefits as part of collective bargaining.  However, the 
agreements are not made part of the contracts; instead, the agreement is to jointly lobby the 
state Legislature for the changes.  These changes are almost always granted.  Second, unions 
sometimes do “end runs” around local elected officials by lobbying the Legislature for 
pension benefits that were rejected or not considered in collective bargaining.  These 
additional benefits are often approved by the Legislature. 
   
The current unnecessarily expensive pension system should be reformed in one of two ways. 
The most dramatic change would be to convert to a defined contribution rather than a 
defined benefit system.  This is now prevalent in the private sector nationally.  Under this 
system the employers’ shares could be set in state legislation or could be allowed to be 
subject to collective bargaining.  Less far reaching would be changes in the current defined 
benefit system to make the benefits more reasonable.  For example, new workers could be 
given benefits that do not include overtime in the benefit calculations, set higher age 
requirements for retirement, and/or require larger contributions to the pension fund from 
the workers.    
 
 
A Revised Framework for Collective Bargaining 
 
While the Taylor Law has prevented the disruption of services to citizens, and has bolstered 
the rights and compensation of public employees in the State, the law has also intruded upon 
the rights of local governments to negotiate with and determine the wages of their own 
employees.  Proposed reforms to the current legal structure generally have at least one of 
three objectives: (1) to make the current dispute resolution process more timely, thereby 
avoiding the fiscal uncertainties of expired and retroactive contracts as well as making the 
Triborough Amendment less significant; (2) to change the criteria and constraints used by 
arbitrators; and (3) to change the conflict resolution process to encourage bargaining and rely 
less on arbitrators judgment. 
 
 More timely process.  Proposals that would lead to more timely settlements 
include having an automatic finding of an impasse if a settlement were not 
reached before a current contract expired or before the end of the fiscal year in 
which a contract expires.  Limits can also be set on the duration of any conflict 
resolution process. 
 
 Alter arbitration criteria and constraints.  More prudent settlements could be 
promoted by mandating that PERB weigh more heavily criteria such as ability to 
pay and past collective agreements.  PERB could also include additional decision 
criteria, such as overall compensation level and changes in the cost of living, 
following the example of New York City’s OCB. State law could require 
arbitrators to award wage increases that will not necessitate tax increases or require 
that any wage increase be funded in part by productivity gains.  
 
With limitations on granting an award for a period longer than two years, the 
Taylor Law restricts arbitrators’ ability to resolve contract disputes as they see best 
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fit.  Arbitrators could be allowed to grant an award that is “chronologically 
current” in the event of severely expired contracts or an award that matches the 
length of the contract that is expired.  
 
 Adopt another model of negotiations.  New York might benefit from using 
resolution processes other than the current system of arbitration.  One option is 
“last-best offer” negotiations.  Under this process, the parties in an impasse 
submit a final offer for consideration by the arbitrator.  The arbitrator renders a 
binding decision by choosing one of the offers.  Last-best offers can be made on 
an item-by-item basis, where the arbitrator renders a decision on offers made by 
the parties for each item in the scope of bargaining, or on a total package basis, in 
which the parties submit one complete offer for all items in the scope of 
bargaining.   
 
A variation on this model is bracketed negotiation.  As in last-best offer 
negotiations, parties submit their last and best offer for consideration.  These 
offers represent the outer limits (high/low offers) of the decision to be made by 
the arbitrator, who does not know of the offers and renders an independent 
judgment.  The arbitrator’s decision is binding if it falls between the high and low 
offer.  If, however, an arbitrator’s determination is higher than the high offer, then 
the high offer becomes binding.  Conversely, if the arbitrator’s decision is lower 
than the low offer, then the low offer becomes binding.  The advantage of the 
last-best and bracketed models is that it encourages vigorous bargaining by the 
parties and inches them closer to agreement on their own, since it is in the interest 
of both parties to minimize the risk of an award that differs greatly from their own 
position.   
 
 
Additional Consolidation Initiatives 
 
Although the State is addressing the issue of fragmentation in several ways, additional 
initiatives for school districts are warranted.  While New York is below average in the total 
number of local governments per capita, outside New York City the state has 16 percent 
more school districts per capita than the national average (refer to Table 9).  The State might 
also benefit from consolidation in its property tax assessment units.81 
 
A study examining school district consolidation in New York from 1985 to 1997 determined 
that the potential savings of consolidation is greatest for smaller districts.82  The study 
concluded that two 300-pupil school districts could reduce operating costs 22 percent by 
consolidating, yet two 1,500-pupil school districts would only reduce their operating costs 8 
                                                 
81 It is important to note that consolidation may exert certain costs including: “averaging up” of wages, 
equipment and facilities; initial cost increases during transition period; unemployment costs; and reductions in 
magnitude or quality of public services.  The majority of consolidation efforts also require approval through a 
public vote, and state labor law requires that unions agree to consolidation of services provided by their 
members.    
82 William Duncombe and John Yinger, Does School District Consolidation Cut Costs? Center for Policy 
Research, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Working Paper No. 33, 
January 2001. 
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percent.  Consolidation has little, if any, impact on total cost reduction for large school 
districts.  Nonetheless, the study highlighted potential for consolidating central 
administrative offices for school districts of all sizes and for sharing transportation services.  
Consolidating two 300-, 900-, or 1,500-pupil school districts resulted in a 36 percent 
reduction in administrative costs and an 18 to 32 percent reduction in transportation costs. 
 
New York currently has 314 school districts with less than 1,500 pupils and 27 districts with 
less than 300 pupils.  A 20 percent reduction in costs for New York schools with less than 
900 students and a 7 percent cost savings for districts with 900 to 1,500 students would 
equate to a total savings of $435 million (see Table 23).  
 
Under 300 300-900 900-1,500 Over 1,500 Total
Number of Districts 27 124 163 362 676
Total Expenditures $128 $1,073 $2,778 $23,163 $27,142
Potential Savings $26 $215 $194 $0 $435
Potential Savings for School Districts from Consolidation
Table 23
Sources: New York State Department of Education, Office of Management Services, Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit, School District 
Fiscal Profiles, Masterfile for 1997-1998 and 2004-2005. William Duncombe and John Yinger, Does School District Consolidation 
Cut Costs? Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Working Paper No. 33, 
January 2001. CBC Staff Calculations.
Excluding New York City
(dollars in millions)
Enrollment
Note: Assumes savings of 20 percent for school districts with less than 900 students; 7 percent savings for school 
districts between 900 and 1500; no savings for school districts with more than 1500 students.
 
 
Another opportunity for shared services is property assessing units.  Currently, the State has 
1,134 assessing units, second only to Michigan for highest number of assessing units.83  The 
assessing units include 151 villages, which duplicate services performed at the town level.  
While 33 states assess property at the county level, in New York only Nassau and Tompkins 
counties assess at the county level.  Maryland assesses at the state level.  Similar to other 
consolidation efforts, the most cost savings potential is for rural counties with few parcels of 
land.  In the State, nine counties have less than 25,000 parcels of land.  In addition to the 
potential cost savings, fewer assessing units would also ensure a greater level of assessment 
equity among municipalities. 
 
                                                 
83 Donald C. DeWitt (New York State Office of Real Property Services), Maximizing the Efficiency of the 
Assessment Function: Guidelines for Transitioning to County Assessing, August 2007. 
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Appendix I: Property Tax Cap Model 
 
Region
School Property Tax 
Burden (per $1,000 
Income)
Number of 
School Districts
Number of 
Constrained 
Districts
Necessary 
Tax 
Reductions
Pupils in 
Constrained 
Districts
Tax 
Reduction 
Per Pupil
Capitol District 60 74 69 213,722,489 149,013 1,434
Albany County 53 13 13 62,012,237 41,699 1,487
Columbia County 59 6 6 11,004,390 9,313 1,182
Greene County 81 6 6 15,283,151 7,682 1,989
Rensselaer County 53 11 11 38,740,653 19,799 1,957
Saratoga County 49 12 9 27,076,418 25,754 1,051
Schenectady County 54 6 6 37,777,007 23,758 1,590
Warren County 67 9 8 10,810,439 10,258 1,054
Washington County 62 11 10 11,018,194 10,750 1,025
Central New York 52 39 39 148,546,825 120,328 1,235
Cayuga County 49 7 7 13,608,726 11,364 1,198
Cortland County 46 5 5 6,690,300 7,619 878
Onondaga County 50 18 18 94,896,885 77,036 1,232
Oswego County 63 9 9 33,350,913 24,309 1,372
Finger Lakes 54 70 69 242,020,405 191,804 1,262
Genesee County 56 8 8 9,355,947 10,249 913
Livingston County 50 8 7 9,221,277 7,828 1,178
Monroe County 51 18 18 160,795,234 117,429 1,369
Ontario County 55 9 9 16,555,610 17,711 935
Orleans County 58 5 5 8,508,359 7,823 1,088
Seneca County 58 4 4 9,537,568 4,945 1,929
Wayne County 57 11 11 23,642,788 17,458 1,354
Wyoming County 49 5 5 3,415,339 5,388 634
Yates County 56 2 2 988,283 2,974 332
Hudson Valley 63 101 40 138,543,079 139,699 992
Dutchess County 46 13 7 13,635,357 28,775 474
Orange County 58 17 13 46,045,155 60,990 755
Putnam County 60 6 2 1,851,127 2,772 668
Rockland County 62 8 1 4,572,853 7,943 576
Sullivan County 109 8 8 33,057,187 10,390 3,182
Ulster County 69 9 6 27,974,153 21,688 1,290
Westchester County 35 40 3 11,407,247 7,141 1,597
Long Island 48 121 8 45,390,927 25,248 1,798
Nassau County 44 56 7 24,486,028 22,461 1,090
Suffolk County 53 65 1 20,904,899 2,787 7,501
Mohawk Valley 53 54 50 84,209,129 83,508 1,008
Fulton County 46 7 7 9,168,194 9,805 935
Herkimer County 55 11 10 9,638,200 12,507 771
Madison County 48 10 9 10,244,222 11,926 859
Montgomery County 52 5 3 9,730,423 6,377 1,526
Oneida County 49 15 15 35,169,295 37,474 939
Schoharie County 69 6 6 10,258,794 5,419 1,893
North Country 78 63 50 40,550,799 62,851 645
Clinton County 52 8 7 10,723,791 12,126 884
Essex County 87 11 10 8,745,821 11,614 753
Franklin County 55 7 6 3,398,776 7,423 458
Hamilton County 200 4 3 1,851,696 487 3,802
Jefferson County  45 11 8 4,850,808 14,885 326
Lewis County 50 5 4 2,296,254 4,090 561
St. Lawrence County 53 17 12 8,683,652 12,226 710
Southern Tier 51 74 71 110,629,268 116,954 946
Broome County 53 12 12 46,231,873 32,233 1,434
Chemung County 42 3 3 8,782,122 12,958 678
Chenango County 49 8 8 5,118,278 9,587 534
Delaware County 80 12 12 9,265,888 7,181 1,290
Otsego County 56 12 11 6,566,678 7,986 822
Schuyler County 46 2 2 2,337,783 2,306 1,014
Steuben County 42 13 12 11,847,950 18,210 651
Tioga County 40 6 5 3,741,387 10,685 350
Tompkins County 53 6 6 16,737,308 15,808 1,059
Western New York 50 80 69 153,373,205 193,577 792
Allegany County 54 12 12 8,087,403 8,289 976
Cattaraugus County 46 12 11 8,894,216 14,463 615
Chautauqua County 58 18 13 14,628,337 18,704 782
Erie County 40 28 23 84,647,170 117,627 720
Niagara County 54 10 10 37,116,079 34,494 1,076
Total 48                               676                    465 1,176,986,124 1,082,982 1,087
Property Tax Cap Model 1
Capped at 1998 Full Value Rate
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Region
School Property Tax 
Burden (per $1,000 
Income)
Number of 
School Districts
Number of 
Constrained 
Districts
Necessary Tax 
Reductions
Pupils in 
Constrained 
Districts
Tax 
Reduction 
Per Pupil
Capitol District 55 74 50 77,827,090 92,410 842
Albany County 53 13 4 5,588,610 4,930 1,134
Columbia County 59 6 5 8,570,442 7,444 1,151
Greene County 81 6 3 5,957,206 4,825 1,235
Rensselaer County 53 11 10 20,471,480 18,712 1,094
Saratoga County 49 12 6 13,151,893 20,314 647
Schenectady County 54 6 3 10,286,298 15,082 682
Warren County 67 9 8 6,867,842 10,258 670
Washington County 62 11 11 6,933,320 10,844 639
Central New York 51 39 34 62,428,687 101,526 615
Cayuga County 49 7 7 12,453,129 11,364 1,096
Cortland County 46 5 5 5,546,368 7,619 728
Onondaga County 50 18 15 32,033,137 68,013 471
Oswego County 63 9 7 12,396,054 14,530 853
Finger Lakes 52 70 62 135,142,954 134,770 1,003
Genesee County 56 8 8 6,644,400 10,249 648
Livingston County 50 8 7 9,398,226 7,828 1,201
Monroe County 51 18 13 68,876,067 64,787 1,063
Ontario County 55 9 8 9,511,595 15,328 621
Orleans County 58 5 5 8,182,278 7,823 1,046
Seneca County 58 4 4 8,107,192 4,945 1,640
Wayne County 57 11 11 19,454,453 17,458 1,114
Wyoming County 49 5 5 4,670,090 5,388 867
Yates County 56 2 1 298,654 964 310
Hudson Valley 44 101 20 52,686,139 51,053 1,032
Dutchess County 46 13 2 611,092 2,148 284
Orange County 58 17 5 14,938,766 25,629 583
Putnam County 60 6 1 4,090,494 1,917 2,134
Rockland County 62 8 1 2,008,564 2,957 679
Sullivan County 109 8 7 15,176,897 8,844 1,716
Ulster County 69 9 1 4,805,631 2,119 2,268
Westchester County 35 40 3 11,054,693 7,439 1,486
Long Island 48 121 6 40,338,140 13,062 3,088
Nassau County 44 56 6 40,338,140 13,062 3,088
Suffolk County 53 65 0 0 0
Mohawk Valley 51 54 48 52,993,944 66,925 792
Fulton County 46 7 7 5,295,019 9,805 540
Herkimer County 55 11 11 10,130,370 13,306 761
Madison County 48 10 9 8,268,946 10,342 800
Montgomery County 52 5 4 7,767,940 6,925 1,122
Oneida County 49 15 11 14,121,986 21,128 668
Schoharie County 69 6 6 7,409,683 5,419 1,367
North Country 56 63 50 40,950,578 59,955 683
Clinton County 52 8 8 9,656,799 18,550 521
Essex County 87 11 8 5,876,292 10,528 558
Franklin County 55 7 5 1,836,750 4,893 375
Hamilton County 200 4 4 3,296,645 553 5,961
Jefferson County  45 11 6 3,321,478 7,572 439
Lewis County 50 5 4 2,411,165 4,090 590
St. Lawrence County 53 17 15 14,551,450 13,769 1,057
Southern Tier 51 74 62 62,482,631 98,316 636
Broome County 53 12 10 11,358,889 23,935 475
Chemung County 42 3 3 10,695,953 12,958 825
Chenango County 49 8 6 3,433,421 6,794 505
Delaware County 80 12 10 7,433,948 5,504 1,351
Otsego County 56 12 11 5,329,854 6,978 764
Schuyler County 46 2 2 3,133,020 2,306 1,359
Steuben County 42 13 11 10,497,502 17,035 616
Tioga County 40 6 4 3,777,463 8,334 453
Tompkins County 53 6 5 6,822,580 14,472 471
Western New York 44 80 57 73,829,543 81,451 906
Allegany County 54 12 12 9,543,783 8,289 1,151
Cattaraugus County 46 12 11 11,849,785 14,463 819
Chautauqua County 58 18 16 16,864,684 16,508 1,022
Erie County 40 28 10 14,442,763 20,764 696
Niagara County 54 10 8 21,128,529 21,427 986
Total 48                               676                    389 598,679,706 699,468 856
Property Tax Cap Model 2
If levy per TWPU capped at 3 percent
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Region
School Property Tax 
Burden (per $1,000 
Income)
Number of 
School Districts
Number of 
Constrained 
Districts
Necessary Tax 
Reductions
Pupils in 
Constrained 
Districts
Tax 
Reduction 
Per Pupil
Capitol District 55 74 71 195,244,965 153,354 1,273
Albany County 53 13 11 42,362,369 36,394 1,164
Columbia County 59 6 6 14,399,999 9,313 1,546
Greene County 81 6 6 13,841,825 7,682 1,802
Rensselaer County 53 11 11 33,374,983 19,799 1,686
Saratoga County 49 12 11 49,942,076 34,308 1,456
Schenectady County 54 6 6 14,458,238 23,758 609
Warren County 67 9 9 15,413,474 11,256 1,369
Washington County 62 11 11 11,452,000 10,844 1,056
Central New York 51 39 37 108,212,215 114,888 942
Cayuga County 49 7 7 14,800,545 11,364 1,302
Cortland County 46 5 5 6,619,317 7,619 869
Onondaga County 50 18 17 68,632,339 76,511 897
Oswego County 63 9 8 18,160,014 19,394 936
.
Finger Lakes 52 70 69 229,488,057 156,960 1,462
Genesee County 56 8 8 11,541,707 10,249 1,126
Livingston County 50 8 8 13,912,890 9,597 1,450
Monroe County 51 18 17 121,097,126 80,815 1,498
Ontario County 55 9 9 25,298,150 17,711 1,428
Orleans County 58 5 5 10,862,170 7,823 1,389
Seneca County 58 4 4 10,787,788 4,945 2,182
Wayne County 57 11 11 26,005,791 17,458 1,490
Wyoming County 49 5 5 6,637,118 5,388 1,232
Yates County 56 2 2 3,345,317 2,974 1,125
Hudson Valley 44 101 98 691,044,815 327,489 2,110
Dutchess County 46 13 12 62,440,301 42,348 1,474
Orange County 58 17 16 125,325,370 67,941 1,845
Putnam County 60 6 6 44,756,047 16,748 2,672
Rockland County 62 8 8 65,467,105 42,388 1,544
Sullivan County 109 8 8 29,914,650 10,390 2,879
Ulster County 69 9 9 52,285,267 28,148 1,857
Westchester County 35 40 39 310,856,075 119,526 2,601
Long Island 48 121 114 881,840,780 435,313 2,026
Nassau County 44 56 55 449,426,192 208,616 2,154
Suffolk County 53 65 59 432,414,588 226,697 1,907
Mohawk Valley 51 54 50 66,647,066 71,475 932
Fulton County 46 7 7 7,442,560 9,805 759
Herkimer County 55 11 11 11,672,903 13,306 877
Madison County 48 10 10 10,745,718 12,188 882
Montgomery County 52 5 4 7,037,559 6,925 1,016
Oneida County 49 15 12 19,860,862 23,832 833
Schoharie County 69 6 6 9,887,465 5,419 1,825
North Country 56 63 55 66,915,365 58,733 1,139
Clinton County 52 8 7 17,696,510 12,126 1,459
Essex County 87 11 11 12,070,551 11,891 1,015
Franklin County 55 7 6 5,737,944 7,423 773
Hamilton County 200 4 4 4,678,080 553 8,459
Jefferson County  45 11 6 4,189,774 6,062 691
Lewis County 50 5 4 3,330,626 4,090 814
St. Lawrence County 53 17 17 19,211,880 16,588 1,158
Southern Tier 51 74 70 116,885,551 110,596 1,057
Broome County 53 12 11 24,055,747 25,922 928
Chemung County 42 3 3 14,831,489 12,958 1,145
Chenango County 49 8 8 5,648,038 9,587 589
Delaware County 80 12 12 13,285,361 7,181 1,850
Otsego County 56 12 12 10,959,249 9,114 1,202
Schuyler County 46 2 2 4,092,359 2,306 1,775
Steuben County 42 13 11 17,076,592 17,035 1,002
Tioga County 40 6 5 8,122,240 10,685 760
Tompkins County 53 6 6 18,814,477 15,808 1,190
Western New York 44 80 70 132,494,361 134,991 982
Allegany County 54 12 12 10,942,632 8,289 1,320
Cattaraugus County 46 12 12 16,901,562 15,445 1,094
Chautauqua County 58 18 17 25,295,918 17,827 1,419
Erie County 40 28 20 50,683,031 67,641 749
Niagara County 54 10 9 28,671,219 25,789 1,112
Total 48                               676                    634 2,488,773,174 1,563,800 1,591
If levy per pupil capped at 3 percent
Property Tax Cap Model 3
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Appendix II: Circuit Breaker Model 
 
Methodology 
The model utilized 2004 New York State personal income tax return data from the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.  
All itemizers are assumed to be homeowners.  Property taxes by income were calculated by subtracting local income taxes (deducted for 
federal income tax purposes) from total taxes deducted for state income tax purposes.  The average property taxes per tax filer represent 
the average property taxes paid per household.  The number of personal income tax filers and the number of households in the State are 
roughly equal.   
 
The hypothetical circuit breaker program offers a credit to homeowners equal to property taxes in excess of 5 percent of New York 
Adjusted Gross Income for owners with less than $20,000 and 7 percent of New York Adjusted Gross Income for owners above $20,000.  
Thus, the total value of the credit for each income bracket equals: Property Taxes – X percent * NYAGI.  
 
For tax filers claiming the standard deduction, the number of homeowners and renters is broken up according to U.S. Census data in the 
2006 American Community Survey of homeowners and renters in New York by income.  The average amount of property taxes paid by 
income bracket is then applied to these homeowners.  The value of the credit follows the same formula as described above. 
 
The model for renters assumes that New York Adjusted Gross Income by varying income brackets does not differ significantly between 
owners and renters.  The model first assumes a “property tax equivalent” for renters, equal to 20 percent of annual rent.  This equivalent 
represents the theoretical amount of property taxes passed onto tenants from the building owners.  The credit for all renters is equal to 
“property taxes” in excess of 6 percent of New York Adjusted Gross Income.  This formula is the equivalent of refunding rent paid in 
excess of 30 percent of NYAGI. 
 
Because the Citizens Budget Commission does not have access to individual tax returns, the analysis works off averages and thus cannot 
incorporate caps on the amount of an individual credit.  
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Number NYAGI Average Number Total Property Average NYAGI for Percent of Prop Taxes above Average
Income Class of Filers (000s) NYAGI Itemizers Tax (000s) Property Tax Itemizers NYAGI percent AGI Credit
Under $5,000 1,170,424 2,247,675 1,920 1,058 3,952 3,736                                 2,031,777                         101,589                          3,850,664                       3,640         
$5,000 - 9,999 823,368 6,122,515 7,436 2,715 4,043 1,489                                 20,188,575                       1,009,429                       3,033,604                       1,117         
10,000 - 19,999 1,264,123 18,584,747 14,702 46,734 117,237 2,509                                 687,068,884                     34,353,444                     82,883,536                      1,774         
20,000 - 29,999 990,224 24,600,542 24,843 101,548 276,514 2,723                                 2,522,798,725                  126,139,936                   150,374,449                    1,481         
30,000 - 39,999 815,073 28,364,117 34,799 157,006 485,547 3,093                                 5,463,727,330                  273,186,366                   212,360,213                    1,353         
40,000 - 49,999 628,266 28,115,821 44,751 165,861 559,305 3,372                                 7,422,521,917                  371,126,096                   188,179,160                    1,135         
50,000 - 59,999 466,514 25,557,906 54,785 149,858 555,903 3,710                                 8,209,950,253                  410,497,513                   145,405,236                    970           
60,000 - 74,999 524,742 35,206,465 67,093 201,324 890,420 4,423                                 13,507,411,995                675,370,600                   215,049,273                    1,068         
75,000 - 99,999 554,372 47,816,086 86,253 259,668 1,354,890 5,218                                 22,397,067,878                1,119,853,394                235,036,614                    905           
100,000 - 199,999 596,606 79,249,743 132,834 376,336 2,683,218 7,130                                 49,990,330,947                2,499,516,547                183,701,394                    488           
200,000  and over 230,838 168,222,927 728,749 159,993 4,268,228 26,678                               116,594,714,914              5,829,735,746                NA NA
Total 8,064,550 464,088,545 57,547 1,622,101 11,199,257 6,904                                226,817,813,195              11,340,890,660              1,419,874,143                 875           
Percent NYAGI for Percent Avg Prop Tax * Property Taxes Above Average
Income Class Number Homeowners Owners Renters Owners Owners of NYAGI Owners  percent of NYAGI Credit
Under $5,000 1,169,366            18.6% 217,429               951,937               218,487              419,580,421                       20,979,021                       816,176,170                   795,197,149                    3,640         
$5,000 - 9,999 820,653               18.6% 152,590               668,063               155,305              1,154,837,861                    57,741,893                       231,271,770                   173,529,877                    1,117         
10,000 - 19,999 1,217,389            32.8% 399,844               817,545               446,578              6,565,453,568                    328,272,678                     1,120,286,432                792,013,754                    1,774         
20,000 - 29,999 888,676               43.5% 386,829               501,847               488,377              12,132,948,916                  849,306,424                     1,329,846,442                480,540,018                    984           
30,000 - 39,999 658,067               47.7% 313,904               344,163               470,910              16,387,411,527                  1,147,118,807                  1,456,304,666                309,185,859                    657           
40,000 - 49,999 462,405               51.9% 239,864               222,541               405,725              18,156,767,280                  1,270,973,710                  1,368,157,007                97,183,298                      240           
50,000 - 59,999 316,656               61.7% 195,230               121,426               345,088              18,905,587,146                  1,323,391,100                  1,280,113,465                (43,277,635)                    (125)          
60,000 - 74,999 323,418               61.7% 199,399               124,019               400,723              26,885,656,193                  1,881,995,934                  1,772,324,897                (109,671,037)                   (274)          
75,000 - 99,999 294,704               71.6% 210,956               83,748                 470,624              40,592,621,378                  2,841,483,496                  2,455,613,271                NA NA
100,000 - 199,999 220,270               79.6% 175,331               44,939                 551,667              73,280,324,376                  5,129,622,706                  3,933,302,248                NA NA
200,000  and over 70,845                 79.6% 56,391                 14,454                 216,384              157,689,891,839                11,038,292,429                5,772,614,964                NA NA
Total 6,442,449            2,547,766            3,894,683            4,169,867           372,171,080,505                25,889,178,198                21,536,011,333              2,647,649,955                635           
Note: Credit equals property taxes exceeding 5 percent of NYAGI for owners with less than $20,000; 7 percent of NYAGI for owners above $20,000; and 6 percent of NYAGI for renters.
All ReturnsStandard Deduction
ItemizersAll Returns
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Number NYAGI Average Number Median Monthly Median Annual 20 percent Total Property NYAGI for Property Taxes Average
Income Class of Filers (000s) NYAGI Renters Rent Rent of Rent Taxes Renters Over .06*NYAGI Credit
Under $5,000 1,170,424 2,247,675 1,920 951,937     581                       6,968                 1,394        1,326,675,503   1,828,094,977     1,216,989,804        1,278     
$5,000 - 9,999 823,368 6,122,515 7,436 668,063     581                       6,968                 1,394        931,051,725      4,967,676,680     632,991,124           948       
10,000 - 19,999 1,264,123 18,584,747 14,702 817,545     682                       8,183                 1,637        1,337,939,901   12,019,293,697   616,782,279           754       
20,000 - 29,999 990,224 24,600,542 24,843 501,847     812                       9,748                 1,950        978,407,917      12,467,593,141   230,352,329           459       
30,000 - 39,999 815,073 28,364,117 34,799 344,163     855                       10,255                2,051        705,864,448      11,976,705,932   NA NA
40,000 - 49,999 628,266 28,115,821 44,751 222,541     897                       10,762                2,152        478,976,255      9,959,053,526     NA NA
50,000 - 59,999 466,514 25,557,906 54,785 121,426     1,022                    12,260                2,452        297,733,492      6,652,319,220     NA NA
60,000 - 74,999 524,742 35,206,465 67,093 124,019     1,022                    12,260                2,452        304,091,413      8,320,808,934     NA NA
75,000 - 99,999 554,372 47,816,086 86,253 83,748       1,185                    14,219                2,844        238,154,164      7,223,464,215     NA NA
100,000 - 199,999 596,606 79,249,743 132,834 44,939       1,580                    18,958                3,792        170,388,721      5,969,418,898     NA NA
200,000  and over 230,838 168,222,927 728,749 14,454       1,580                    18,958                3,792        54,801,784        10,533,035,422   NA NA
Total 8,064,550 464,088,545 57,547 3,894,683  6,824,085,323  91,917,464,642  2,697,115,536        693
All Returns Property Tax Equivalent
 
 
